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AN ILLIBERAL UNION
Sonu Bedi*
ABSTRACT
This Article breaks new ground by applying the philosophical framework of
liberal neutrality (most famously articulated by John Rawls) to the United States
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on marriage. At first blush, the Court’s decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges—the culmination of marriage rights—seems to affirm a cen-
tral principle of liberalism, namely equal access to marriage regardless of sexual ori-
entation. Gays and lesbians can finally take part in an institution that celebrates the
union of two committed individuals. But perversely, in its attempt to expand access
to marriage, the Court has simultaneously entrenched values that are antithetical to
the basic tenants of liberal neutrality. Working at the nexus of political theory and
constitutional law, this Article provides the first critique of marriage as an illiberal
union. It focuses on three problems with the current state of marriage: one, marriage
is problematically a spiritual—not secular—status, affirming an intangible quality
that threatens the separation of church and state; two, in marrying couples, the state
stigmatizes those who choose not to marry; and three, by promoting monogamy,
marriage unreasonably excludes alternative adult relationships and even permits the
state to criminalize certain kinds of sexual activity. By questioning the legitimacy of
the institution itself, this Article breaks from the usual focus on the issue of access.
It ultimately suggests a radical rethinking of the relationship between marriage and
the state’s role in regulating it, where marriage becomes a private contract rather than
a state-sanctioned, civil institution.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges1 impor-
tantly expanded the institution of civil marriage to gays and lesbians, affirming the
significance of marriage and its central and enduring role in society as a union of
two committed individuals.2 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority,
provided a powerful objection to bans on gay marriage.3 This Article, the first to do
so, argues that the very considerations that invalidate these bans perversely reveal
why marriage itself as a state-sanctioned institution is illiberal. We should contest
marriage, not celebrate it.
This Article draws from liberal neutrality, a political theory famously defended
by John Rawls, to support this claim. Liberal neutrality contends the state must not
justify its exercise of power by simply appealing to controversial religious or moral
conceptions of the good.4 A conception of the good is a belief about what kind of
1 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2 Id. at 2608. Unless noted otherwise, by “marriage,” I mean civil marriage where the
state confers and regulates the status of being married.
3 See generally id. This Article uses “same-sex marriage” and “gay marriage” inter-
changeably, recognizing that the state bans struck down in Obergefell formally track gender
or sex, not sexuality. See infra note 261.
4 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 19 (expanded ed. 2005) (“[A] conception of the
good normally consists of a more or less determinate scheme of final ends, that is, ends we want
to realize for their own sake . . . .”). See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN
THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); RONALD C. DEN OTTER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AN AGE OF MORAL
PLURALISM (2009); KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS
(1995); CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987); Lawrence B.
Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (1993).
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life has “intrinsic or inherent value.”5 This framework holds that a liberal state ought
not to favor one way of living over another when it comes to our personal and inti-
mate lives simply because it finds that way of life intrinsically superior.6 We live in
a pluralist society where adults have differing, even idiosyncratic, ideas about how
to arrange their intimate lives. Laws and policies ought not to favor one such con-
ception of the good over another. To do so is not to treat individuals as moral equals.
According to Ronald Dworkin, liberalism’s commitment to treating “citizens as
equals” requires that “political decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent
of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life.”7 Recent
work in liberal neutrality suggests that a state unravel and get out of the marriage
“business” precisely because marriage laws rest on contested moral or religious con-
ceptions of the good.8 They improperly favor the married over the unmarried.
This Article breaks new ground by applying this philosophical argument to the
Court’s jurisprudence on marriage. Working at the nexus of political theory and
constitutional law,9 this Article provides a novel analysis of Obergefell and the legal
5 JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION 12 (2011) (emphasis removed);
see also GEORGE SHER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS 9 (1997)
(discussing how those who seek perfectionism look for the “good life” through intrinsic or
inherent value).
6 QUONG, supra note 5, at 5–6 (differentiating the diverse concepts of perfectionism for
different individuals).
7 Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 127 (Stuart
Hampshire ed., 1978).
8 See, e.g., ELIZABETH BRAKE, MINIMIZING MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE, MORALITY, AND THE
LAW (2012); TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT: MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE CASE
FOR THEIR DIVORCE (2010); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law:
Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
277, 284 (2004); David M. Estlund, Shaping and Sex: Commentary on Parts I and II, in SEX,
PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY: ESSAYS ON LAW AND NATURE 148 (David M. Estlund & Martha
C. Nussbaum eds., 1997) [hereinafter SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY]; Tamara Metz, The
Liberal Case for Disestablishing Marriage, 6 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 196 (2007).
Recent liberal theory also questions limitations on plural marriage or consanguinity. See,
e.g., RONALD C. DEN OTTER, IN DEFENSE OF PLURAL MARRIAGE (2015); Ronald C. Den
Otter, Three May Not Be a Crowd: The Case for a Constitutional Right to Plural Marriage,
64 EMORY L.J. 1977 (2015); Andrew F. March, Is There a Right to Polygamy? Marriage,
Equality and Subsidizing Families in Liberal Public Justification, 8 J. MORAL PHIL. 246
(2011). March describes his argument as “[t]he Slippery Slope and the Slide from Same-Sex
Marriage to Polygamy.” March, supra, at 246.
9 John Rawls famously proposes that “the limits imposed by public reason” apply to
“‘constitutional essentials’ and questions of basic justice.” RAWLS, supra note 4, at 214. The
Supreme Court, according to Rawls, is an “exemplar of public reason.” Id. at 216. As he puts
it: “[O]ur exercise of political power is proper . . . only when it is exercised in accordance
with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse
in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.” Id. at 217.
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debate over gay marriage to inform and expand a liberal critique of marriage. It draws
from the Court’s own understanding of marriage to demonstrate that this civil insti-
tution is riddled with at least three hitherto unnoticed illiberal qualities.
First, at its core, marriage is problematically a spiritual—not secular—status.
It is not based on tangible benefits, but an intangible quality that threatens the sep-
aration of church and state. Kennedy in Obergefell even refers to marriage as a
“sacred”10 and “transcendent”11 union. The distinction between civil unions and mar-
riage, which has been so important to the debate over gay marriage, problematically
reveals that there is an ethical dimension to marriage, one that even triggers Estab-
lishment Clause concerns.
Second, in marrying couples, the state also stigmatizes the unmarried. The idea
that marriage is a normative and ethical ideal explains why bans on same-sex mar-
riage demean gays and lesbians, depriving them of access to a revered institution.
But it is precisely the reverence that attaches to marriage that demeans those who
choose not to marry, whether they are gay or straight. This is because, in sanctioning
marriage, the state takes a side in what ought to be each individual’s personal choice
about how to structure and organize intimate life. The state essentializes gay identity
by advocating a heteronormative view of intimacy. This marginalizes those sexu-
alities that do not fit the marriage mold. Marriage reinforces the idea that a life with
a committed romantic partner is superior to a life without one.
Third, the Court makes clear, going back to Reynolds v. United States12 and re-
affirming in Obergefell, that monogamy is central to the meaning of marriage, and
that laws in all fifty states inform this feature of marriage.13 This Article argues that by
promoting monogamy, marriage unjustifiably excludes alternative adult relationships,
including polyamory and platonic unions devoted to caregiving. In fact, if marriage
is legitimate, so too are current criminal laws that prohibit adultery, laws that seek
to protect what Kennedy calls a “keystone of our social order” and a “building block
of our national community.”14 Marriage perversely allows the state to criminalize
what adults do in their intimate lives, thereby threatening a sphere of sexual liberty.
Part of the reason these implications go unnoticed is that the constitutional
debate over marriage is about the legitimacy of restrictions on marriage.15 For instance,
the central issue in Obergefell was whether the state acts constitutionally in limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples.16 By invaliding such limitations, the Court expands
10 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
11 Id.
12 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
13 See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
14 Id. at 2601.
15 Cf. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (invalidating limitations on marriage based
on status as a prisoner); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating limitations on
marriage based on race).
16 See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
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access to the institution of marriage, making clear that it is illiberal for a state to priv-
ilege a heterosexual view of marriage over its gay counterpart.17 Obergefell undoubt-
edly affirms the liberal principle of equality that underlies the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In one sense, this decision comports with a theory
of liberal neutrality.
But if we take liberal neutrality seriously, as this Article does, it also means that
marriage itself violates such liberal precepts, privileging a married lifestyle, regard-
less of sexual orientation, over an unmarried one. Obergefell’s equal access reason-
ing perversely entrenches values that are antithetical to liberal neutrality. Underlying
Obergefell’s commitment to marriage, whether gay or straight, is a commitment to
an illiberal union: one that threatens the separation of church and state; stigmatizes
those who choose not to marry; and permits the state to criminalize certain kinds of
sexual activity. This Article, in turn, breaks from the usual focus on the issue of access
to marriage to focus our attention on the legitimacy of the institution itself. Drawing
from a normative framework of liberal neutrality, this Article criticizes marriage, ar-
guing that this kind of union is actually illiberal.18
Given these problems with the institution of marriage itself, what ought we to do?
This Article concludes by suggesting that the state should get out of the marriage
business, where marriage becomes a private contract rather than a state-sanctioned,
civil institution. Although this may seem like a radical conclusion, this Article con-
siders some of the implications for taking seriously the commitment to liberal neu-
trality. Even though this may appear unfair to those gay and lesbian couples who are
only now able to marry, perhaps the state can support the equal status of gays and
lesbians without resorting to marriage. Providing a curative step to liberal neutrality,
this Article briefly suggests one such option.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I, a brief primer on liberal neutrality, ex-
plicates the key claims of this philosophical framework.19 The remaining parts of this
Article examine marriage in light of it. Part II argues that marriage is a spiritual—
not secular—status.20 Distinguishing civil unions from marriage, this Article explains
why the label of marriage triggers Establishment Clause concerns. Part III posits that
marriage stigmatizes the unmarried by treating the unmarried lifestyle as inferior.21
Part IV reveals that marriage as a two-person, monogamous union both unjustifiably
excludes other living arrangements adults may choose to pursue and even permits
17 See id. at 2601.
18 Some of this Article draws from and builds upon parts of Chapters 2 and 6 of my book
Beyond Race, Sex, and Sexual Orientation: Legal Equality Without Identity. Most notably,
in drawing on Obergefell, which the Court decided after publication of the book, this Article
goes beyond the arguments of those chapters. SONU BEDI, BEYOND RACE, SEX, AND SEXUAL
ORIENTATION: LEGAL EQUALITY WITHOUT IDENTITY (2013).
19 See discussion infra Part I.
20 See discussion infra Part II.
21 See discussion infra Part III.
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the state to criminalize certain kinds of sexual activity.22 Part V answers the question,
“if not marriage, what?”—reconciling this Article’s argument in light of a fundamental
right to marry and a concern with ensuring equal citizenship for gays and lesbians.23
I. A BRIEF PRIMER ON LIBERAL NEUTRALITY
The principle of public reason or justification is a familiar one.24 This principle
seeks to subject state action to some kind of justificatory constraint.25 One variant
of this principle of public justification is a commitment to liberal neutrality: a com-
mitment that requires democratic citizens to proffer reasons that their fellow listeners
could ideally accept.26 This kind of justificatory constraint rules out those reasons
from the realm of law making that do not meet this principle.27 This version of pub-
lic reason contends that conceptions of the good life are illegitimate justificatory
grounds for state legislation, because these conceptions cannot in principle be shared
by all.28 Individuals disagree about how to structure their personal and intimate lives,
so the state ought to remain neutral among these conceptions—hence, the label
“liberal neutrality.”29
The principle of liberal neutrality is the more familiar interpretation of justificatory
liberalism. Theorists such as Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, Charles Larmore,
John Rawls, and Lawrence Solum endorse this approach.30 Lawrence Solum calls this
approach an “exclusionary” account of public reason or public justification.31 It is
“exclusionary” because it does not permit all justifications to count as legitimate.32
22 See discussion infra Part IV.
23 See discussion infra Part V.
24 See generally, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 4; RAINER FORST, CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE:
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BEYOND LIBERALISM AND COMMUNITARIANISM (John M. M. Farrell
trans., 2002); GREENAWALT, supra note 4; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990);
LARMORE, supra note 4; RAWLS, supra note 4; HOWARD H. SCHWEBER, DEMOCRACY AND
AUTHENTICITY: TOWARD A THEORY OF PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION (2012); JÜRGEN HABERMAS,
Remarks on Legitimation Through Human Rights, in THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION:
POLITICAL ESSAYS 113 (Max Pensky trans. & ed., 2001).
25 See Solum, supra note 4, at 732–35 (discussing the role and justification for public
reason).
26 See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 4.
27 See generally DEN OTTER, supra note 4; Solum, supra note 4.
28 See Solum, supra note 4, at 732–35.
29 See, e.g., id. (discussing public reason and the necessity that ideas must generate sup-
port among significant groups); see also BEDI, supra note 18, at 8–9.
30 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 4; LARMORE, supra note 4; RAWLS, supra note 4;
Solum, supra note 4. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 181–237
(1985) (specifically examining the intersection of liberalism and justice).
31 See Solum, supra note 4, at 743–44.
32 Id. at 743.
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It deems those reasons that invoke a conception of the good non-public.33 Ronald Den
Otter powerfully expounds upon this “exclusionary” approach by arguing that it is
“the best interpretation of an ideal of public justification.”34 In fact, Cass Sunstein
argues that American constitutional law is indeed about a “republic of reasons” where
“[t]he required reason must count as a public-regarding one. Government cannot ap-
peal to private interest alone.”35 Though Sunstein does not explicitly deploy this argu-
ment in light of liberal neutrality, his theory importantly highlights the centrality of
justification. If a state enacts laws and policies based on these illegitimate reasons,
it fails to treat individuals as moral equals.36 According to Ronald Dworkin, liberal-
ism’s commitment to treating “citizens as equals” requires that “political decisions
must be, so far as is possible, independent of any particular conception of the good
life, or of what gives value to life.”37
John Rawls famously defines “the good” as “a conception of what is valuable in
human life.”38 This is a belief about what counts as a good, appropriate, or worthwhile
life: “Thus, a conception of the good normally consists of a more or less determinate
scheme of final ends, that is, ends we want to realize for their own sake . . . .”39 A con-
ception of the good is a belief about privileging a certain way of living over another
for its own sake. It is about what kind of life has “intrinsic or inherent value.”40 Often,
these conceptions of the good are based on religious or moral doctrines. Liberal neu-
trality contends that these conceptions are illegitimate grounds for state legislation.41
33 Id. at 746 (defining non-public reasons to include “deep beliefs about the nature of the
good that form part of various comprehensive religious and moral doctrines”).
34 DEN OTTER, supra note 4, at 139.
35 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 17 (1993); see also BEDI, supra note
18, at 9 (“This book suggests that at its best, equality under the law is about ruling out laws
and policies that are based on constitutionally inadmissible reasons or rationales, rationales
that liberal neutrality may also consider illegitimate.”).
36 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 35, at 17 (“If [the government distributes] something to one
group rather than another, . . . it must explain itself.”); see also BEDI, supra note 18, at 9
(arguing that the state may not pass laws which privilege one way of life over another).
37 Dworkin, supra note 7, at 127.
38 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 19.
39 Id.
40 QUONG, supra note 5, at 12; see also SHER, supra note 5, at 9.
41 But anti-perfectionism is controversial and challenged by liberals and non-liberals alike.
See generally, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS
(2002); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE
LIBERAL STATE (1991); ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
PUBLIC MORALITY (1993); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY?
(1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD?: RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
(2003); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998); SHER, supra note 5; STEVEN WALL, LIBERALISM,
PERFECTIONISM AND RESTRAINT (1998); Robert P. George, “Same-Sex Marriage” and
“Moral Neutrality,” in HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 141 (Christopher
Wolfe ed., 1999).
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This does not mean that the state should be “neutral regarding its effect on various
conceptions of the good.”42 Laws and policies may very well adversely affect a par-
ticular way of life. For instance, the criminal law no doubt makes it difficult for some-
one to live believing that committing such wrongful acts is a worthwhile way to live.
But liberal neutrality is about the justification of laws and policies, not their impact
on individuals.43 As Jonathan Quong puts it:
So long as the reasons underlying the central principles of the
state are acceptable to all reasonable citizens, then the liberal
principle of legitimacy is realized. Again, because reasonable
For instance, there is an interpretation of this justificatory enterprise that endorses a com-
mitment to perfectionism. Theorists such as Joseph Raz, George Sher, and Steven Wall argue
that a liberal state may indeed appeal to particular conceptions of the good life to justify laws
and policies. See generally RAZ, supra; SHER, supra note 5; WALL, supra. Although these
accounts vary in the degree to which a state may invoke perfectionist beliefs, they generally
point to the permissibility of legislation that rests on the idea that certain ways of living are
intrinsically more valuable than others. One salient strand of this kind of perfectionism is
Christopher Eberle’s argument that religious rationales ought indeed to suffice as a legitimate
basis for lawmaking. See EBERLE, supra, at 137 (arguing that there is a “legitimate expectation”
that religiously motivated laws will not be coercive and therefore can be considered a rational
basis for lawmaking); see also PERRY, supra, at xiii (“[R]eliance on religiously grounded
morality is neither illegitimate . . . nor unconstitutional . . . .”). Eberle argues that forcing
those who are religious to bracket their perfectionist reasons is unfair. Doing so fails to treat
them as equal citizens. See EBERLE, supra, at 137.
But recent scholarly work seeks to defend liberal neutrality from these and other criticisms.
See generally, e.g., MATTHEW CLAYTON, JUSTICE AND LEGITIMACY IN UPBRINGING (2006);
STEVEN LECCE, AGAINST PERFECTIONISM: DEFENDING LIBERAL NEUTRALITY (2008); QUONG,
supra note 5; SCHWEBER, supra note 24, at 12–13; LUCAS SWAINE, THE LIBERAL CONSCIENCE:
POLITICS AND PRINCIPLE IN A WORLD OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM (2006). Swaine makes a
powerful argument that even theocrats—those who favor a very strong role for religion in
politics—should opt for a conception of public justification that largely avoids appealing to
religious rationales. SWAINE, supra, at xvi (arguing that liberals should “provid[e] theocrats
with a principled, well-reasoned, and conscientious political settlement that liberals and theo-
crats can jointly affirm”). So, if the most hardcore of religious observers should prefer a kind
of commitment to liberal neutrality from their own moral position, it ought to be the choice
of those who hold a more watered-down version of the role of religion in politics.
42 Jonathan Quong, The Scope of Public Reason, 52 POL. STUD. 233, 233 (2004).
43 Similarly, constitutional law does not generally look at the effects of a law in determining
whether, for instance, there is an equal protection violation. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding a police officer recruitment test on equal protection grounds,
even though a disproportionate number of black applicants failed the test). The Court has “not
embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects
a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially dispropor-
tionate impact.” Id. at 239. Rather, the standard for imposing strict scrutiny requires that “the
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because
of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Pers. Adm’r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (upholding a Massachusetts law that automatically preferred
veterans over nonveterans, even though it had a disproportionate impact on women).
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people disagree about the good life, the state will have to eschew
any appeals to conceptions of the good in justifying its core prin-
ciples. Put another way, only public reasons—reasons that are
acceptable to all reasonable citizens—can legitimate the coercive
use of state power over its citizens.44
So, the criminal law would be legitimate as long as it was based on reasons that could
genuinely be shared by all, such as preventing harm to others.45
Given that, one criticism worth noting of liberal neutrality is that such a princi-
ple may seem self-defeating. That is, the idea that the state ought to remain neutral
among competing moral values in justifying laws and policies is itself a moral value.
So how can liberal neutrality ever be truly impartial?46 One way to thwart this objec-
tion is to realize that liberal neutrality does not require that the state be neutral to any
and all moral values in justifying laws and policies.47 Rather, it requires that the state
only be neutral to conceptions of the good.48 For instance, deciding that a particular
way of life benefits others (e.g., a life where one does not steal) is no doubt a moral
value. But liberal neutrality would not rule out laws and policies such as the criminal
law that are based on it. The moral values that are problematic are those that deem
a particular way of life worthwhile or valuable for its own sake.49 It is the “for its
own sake” qualification that is crucial.
Hence, the criminal law, as a paradigmatic example, is not based on a belief about
the inherent goodness of a particular way of life. Rather, the criminal law rests on
the idea that not engaging in certain acts, such as stealing, assaulting, or defrauding,
have extrinsic or public benefits—benefits that accrue to others. Put simply, the
criminal law seeks to prevent harm to others, not to impose a way of life because
that way of life is intrinsically good or valuable. As I elucidate in Beyond Race, Sex,
and Sexual Orientation:
Liberal neutrality only rules out those laws and policies based on
the idea that a particular orthodoxy is inherently good. Or consider
that laws relating to drug abuse or environmental protection do not
seem to rest on the idea that certain ways of living are intrinsically
44 Quong, supra note 42, at 233; see also LARMORE, supra note 4, at 44 (“But any goals
for whose pursuit there exists a neutral justification are ones that a liberal state may pursue.”).
45 See SONU BEDI, REJECTING RIGHTS 64–65 (2009) (arguing that, properly understood,
John Stuart Mill’s harm principle represents a justificatory constraint that accords with liberal
neutrality and the Court’s jurisprudence in the areas of property, religion, and privacy).
46 See, e.g., GALSTON, supra note 41, at 3 (stating that liberal purposes often “define what
the members of a liberal community must have in common”). For other criticisms of liberal
neutrality, see supra note 41.
47 See Quong, supra note 42, at 233–34.
48 See id.
49 See id.
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better for the individual who undertakes them. Rather, these
laws are about benefitting or protecting others: Environmental
protections ensure that future generations are not saddled with
a less habitable world. Drug abuse laws seek to protect others
from anti-social behavior. The point is that these laws are quali-
tatively different from a law that prohibits a kind of consensual
sexual activity on the idea that such activity is inherently better
than another or that a certain way of life is sinful or contrary to
some religious doctrine.50
The state violates liberal neutrality when it passes legislation on the idea that certain
ways of life are good “for its own sake,” and such laws are often based on particular
moral or religious precepts.51
In applying this justificatory constraint, the state must proffer its reasons in good
faith. Though this constitutes an important—even obvious—part of the requirement of
liberal neutrality, it has gone unnoticed by political and legal theorists. If a reason ap-
pears legitimate, but is put forth disingenuously or in bad faith, this cannot accord with
liberal neutrality.52 Deploying such reasons arbitrarily or strategically to avoid a require-
ment of justification would undo the justificatory constraint itself. Micah Schwartzman
makes a robust defense of what he calls a requirement of “public sincerity”:
Citizens and public officials cannot know whether their reasons
are shared or otherwise sufficient to support their views unless
they subject those reasons to public scrutiny. But if everyone ex-
pects others to act strategically by offering insincere reasons, then
the epistemic value of deliberation is diminished, if not altogether
extinguished. To preserve the significance of deliberation, then,
citizens ought to conform with a principle of public sincerity.53
This means that a state cannot proffer an otherwise legitimate rationale in bad faith.54
If it were able to do so, the justificatory constraint of liberal neutrality would be eas-
ily undone.
II. MARRIAGE AS A SPIRITUAL—NOT SECULAR—STATUS
The remaining parts of this Article apply this framework to analyze and criticize
marriage in light of the Court’s jurisprudence. In Loving v. Virginia,55 the Court
50 BEDI, supra note 18, at 10–11.
51 See id. at 10.
52 Micah Schwartzman, The Sincerity of Public Reason, 19 J. POL. PHIL. 375, 376 (2011)
(discussing insincerity objections to otherwise apparently legitimate rationales).
53 Id. at 378.
54 See id. at 397–98.
55 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating anti-miscegenation laws).
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affirmed that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”56 In Loving
and other cases culminating in Obergefell, the Court held that there is a fundamental
right to marry the person of one’s choice.57 In discussing the nature of marriage, courts
have made clear that marriage is a spiritual union.58 Obergefell even says that marriage
is “sacred”59 and “transcendent.”60 No other civil status invokes this kind of religious
and ethical underpinning, and it is precisely this underpinning that problematically
justifies bans on gay marriage. Part II draws from the Establishment Clause in elab-
orating upon these claims—claims that reveal that marriage itself violates a principle
of separation of church and state.
A. Establishment Clause: A Secular Purpose
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause61 of the First Amend-
ment to embody a commitment to religious neutrality. Edward Rubin suggests that
the idea of neutrality “probably remains the leading interpretation of the Establishment
Clause.”62 The Court’s jurisprudence on neutrality looks to three tests in determining
56 Id. at 12.
57 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). These cases locate the fundamental
right to marry in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But see Cass R.
Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2085 (2005) (“I suggest that for
courts, the best way to carry out that task is by reference not to the Due Process Clause, which
is founded on tradition, but the Equal Protection Clause, which calls traditions into sharp
doubt. The question is whether a state has an adequate justification, under the appropriate
standard of review, to deny certain people access to the expressive and material benefits of
marriage.”). Obergefell looks both to the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause
in affirming a fundamental right to marry:
The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty prom-
ised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amend-
ment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. The Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound
way, though they set forth independent principles.
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015); see Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell
v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 174 (2015) (“Obergefell . . . invokes both values—due
process and equal protection—rather than relying solely on due process.”).
58 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
59 135 S. Ct. at 2594.
60 Id.
61 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . .”).
62 Edward Rubin, Assisted Suicide, Morality, and Law: Why Prohibiting Assisted Suicide
Violates the Establishment Clause, 63 VAND. L. REV. 763, 785 (2010) (arguing that bans on
assisted suicide violate the Establishment Clause). According to Rubin:
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whether a law violates the Establishment Clause: “First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion.’”63 This Article primarily focuses on the first
test—the requirement that the law have a secular purpose. After all, if the law fails
this test, it clearly violates the Establishment Clause.64 Michael Perry argues that this
principle of non-establishment means that “laws for which the only discernible ratio-
nale is an offending religious rationale” are constitutionally illegitimate.65
In my book Beyond Race, Sex, and Sexual Orientation, I defend the idea that
neutrality is central to the Court’s Establishment jurisprudence:
In Epperson v. Arkansas (1968) (invalidating an Arkansas law
that forbade the teaching of evolution in public schools), the
Court affirm[ed] this core principle arguing that the “First Amend-
ment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and nonreligion.” In McCreary
County v. ACLU (2005), the Court held that a Ten Command-
ments display in a courthouse violated the Establishment Clause.
The Court made clear that this standard of neutrality is one of
purpose or justification:
Establishment Clause doctrine in general centers around three basic prin-
ciples, which can be described—moving from most to least restrictive on
governmental action—as strict separation, neutrality, and accommoda-
tion. Strict separation . . . sees the First Amendment as having erected
a “high and impregnable” wall between church and state and as creating
an essentially secular government. Its stringency has led to its decline in
recent years and to its displacement by the principle of neutrality. Neu-
trality forbids government from favoring one religion over another, but
is distinguishable from strict separation, at least in theory, because it also
forbids the government from favoring secularism over religion. . . . The
third principle, frequently described as accommodation, reflects the
Court’s more sympathetic treatment of religion in recent years. It per-
mits the government to acknowledge and accommodate the religious
character of the American people and only invalidates laws that coerce
religious activity or fail to treat different religions equally.
Id. at 784–86 (footnotes omitted).
63 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (internal citation omitted) (quoting
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
64 Id. at 612.
65 See Michael J. Perry, Religion as a Basis of Law-Making?: Herein of the Non-
Establishment of Religion, 35 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 105, 114 (2009). Even if liberal
political theorists may disagree over the legitimacy of invoking religious justifications for
laws and policies, see supra note 4 and accompanying text, it is hardly controversial that
such justifications are generally unconstitutional in the United States.
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When the government acts with the ostensible and
predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates
that central Establishment Clause value of official reli-
gious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the gov-
ernment’s ostensible object is to take sides.66
Laws or policies based on the idea that a particular religious way of life is
superior to another, or that religion is superior to a non-religious way of life are
unconstitutional.67 This is why Justice Sandra Day O’Connor famously suggested
that by favoring such a religious way of life, the state “sends a message to non-
adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and
an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of
66 BEDI, supra note 18, at 81–82 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968);
McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005)).
67 See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). The Court struck down on establishment grounds a Texas
sales tax exemption for religious periodicals and a Connecticut statute that provided Sabbath
observers an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their day of Sabbath, respectively.
In these two cases, religion was so advantaged as to run afoul of the Establishment Clause.
In Thornton, the Court held that the Connecticut statute did not have a secular purpose. By
imposing on employers “an absolute duty to conform their business practices to the particular
religious practices of the employee,” the statute advanced religion. Thornton, 472 U.S. at 709.
In smoking out this illegitimate purpose, the concurring opinion realized that the exempting
statute did not afford non-religious practices similar accommodation. Id. at 711 (O’Connor,
J., concurring).
Similarly, in Texas Monthly, the Court invalidated a Texas law that gave a sales tax ex-
emption only to religious periodicals. The exclusive nature of the tax, like its counterpart in
Thornton, suggested that an illegitimate purpose was afoot; the rationale was not secular.
Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15. As the Court reasoned, Texas could not claim that it sought
to subsidize, by an exemption, the community’s cultural and intellectual character—an other-
wise legitimate rationale. Id. Since the exemption applied only to religious and no other cultural
or intellectual groups, this could not have been the purpose. Id. at 16–17. Consequently, these
kinds of laws fail constitutional muster. But see Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New
York, where the Court upheld a New York law under the Establishment Clause that granted
a tax exemption for “religious, educational or charitable purposes.” 397 U.S. at 666–67
(citation omitted). Here, unlike in Thornton and Texas Monthly, the legislation did not seek
to advance religion. The Court reasoned that the New York law did not
single[ ] out one particular church or religious group or even churches
as such; rather, it has granted exemption to all houses of religious wor-
ship within a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public
corporations which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific,
professional, historical, and patriotic groups.
Id. at 673. Because the law exempted other non-profit groups including religion, the “legis-
lative purpose of the property tax exemption [was] neither the advancement nor the inhibition
of religion.” Id. at 672.
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the political community.”68 Rather than finding reasons that all—both adherents and
non-adherents—can share, the state endorses a particular religious view.
There is an underlying logic69 that connects the cases decided under the Estab-
lishment Clause to cases like Lawrence v. Texas.70 In Lawrence, the Court struck
down sodomy laws, holding that “the fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for up-
holding a law prohibiting the practice.”71 Lawrence rejects morals legislation, legis-
lation based simply on the idea that a particular way of life is wrong or immoral.72
68 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (upholding
a city’s display of a nativity scene under the Establishment Clause); see also Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 603–04 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (holding that school prayer delivered
by a religious figure violated the Establishment Clause).
69 See, e.g., Andrew D. Cohen, Note, How the Establishment Clause Can Influence
Substantive Due Process: Adultery Bans After Lawrence, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 605 (2010)
(reasoning that adultery bans are unconstitutional under Lawrence v. Texas and the Estab-
lishment Clause).
70 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating sodomy laws).
71 Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting)).
72 See Sonu Bedi, Repudiating Morals Legislation: Rendering the Constitutional Right
to Privacy Obsolete, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 447 (2005); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based
Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233,
1234–36 (2004) (footnote omitted):
Rather than representing a break with tradition, Lawrence reflected the
Court’s long-standing jurisprudential discomfort with explicit morals-
based rationales for lawmaking. Notwithstanding its ubiquitous rhetorical
endorsements of government’s police power to promote morality, it
turns out that the Court has almost never relied exclusively and overtly
on morality to justify government action. Indeed, since the middle of the
twentieth century, the Court has never relied exclusively on an explicit
morals-based justification in a majority opinion that is still good law.
For example, in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), and Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), the Court partially appealed to non-morality-based (neutral)
language in failing to provide constitutional protection for bigamy and obscenity, respectively.
Goldberg, supra, at 1261–81 (exploring “[t]he Non-Moral Foundations of the Cornerstone
Morality Cases”). The Reynolds decision, as Goldberg interestingly points out, “never once
mentioned the word ‘morality.’” Id. at 1265. In that decision, the Court argues that “polygamy
leads to the patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the
people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection with
monogamy.” Id. (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166). Similarly, in Paris Adult Theatre I, the
Court noted that this case “goes beyond whether someone, or even the majority, considers the
conduct depicted as ‘wrong’ or ‘sinful.’” Id. at 1269 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S.
at 69).
This was not the language of Bowers, where the majority’s moral disapproval was deemed
sufficient on its own to uphold sodomy laws. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Instead, the Paris Adult Theatre I decision reasoned that “States have the power to make a
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This is why Lawrence makes clear that “[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime . . . are central to the liberty pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”73 This liberty entails the freedom “to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life.”74
In this way, laws and policies based on only moral reasons are unconstitutional
for exactly the same principle as laws based on religious considerations. Religious
neutrality constitutes a specific commitment to the more general principle of liberal
neutrality explicated above. After all, as a philosophical matter, religious reasons are
an improper basis for legislation precisely because religion plays such a deep, per-
sonal, and intimate role in an individual’s life. And individuals disagree about the
role such beliefs should play in their lives. The state ought to remain neutral among
them. Similarly, intimate decisions about whom to date, love, and be sexually inti-
mate with are just as deep and personal.75 A constitutional ban on morals legislation
and the principle of non-establishment share an often-overlooked underlying logic.76
Put simply, both point to a doctrinal commitment that legislation must have, in the
language of a pivotal case concerning public funds and religious schools, a “secular
legislative purpose.”77 Just as individuals may disagree about what kind of sexual or
intimate life is worthwhile “for its own sake,” so too may individuals disagree about
the importance and relevance of faith in their own lives.78 After all, Lawrence de-
scribes this freedom as the liberty to define one’s own concept “of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”79 In turn, the constitutional requirement
of a secular purpose shares synergy with liberal neutrality.80
morally neutral judgment that public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such
material, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole, to endanger the public safety,
or to jeopardize . . . the States’‘right . . . to maintain a decent society.’” Goldberg, supra, at
1270 (alterations in original) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69). See generally
BEDI, supra note 18.
73 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992)).
74 Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
75 See generally DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS:
RACE, GENDER, RELIGION AS ANALOGIES 4–5 (1999) (highlighting that “structural injustice”
dehumanizes individuals whose identities fall outside the social norm).
76 See generally id.
77 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (invalidating Pennsylvania law that
provided supplemental compensation to nonpublic school teachers). See generally Andrew
Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87 (2002) (cautioning against abandoning the
secular purpose doctrine).
78 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)); see, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S.
703 (1985).
79 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
80 See Edward B. Foley, Political Liberalism and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,
43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 963, 963–64 (1993) (“The Establishment Clause, properly construed,
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The Court has rejected Establishment Clause challenges in those cases where
the law may have had its origin in religion but no longer does. In such cases, the law
has shed its religious character, leaving only a secular purpose. This was the circum-
stance in a series of cases upholding Sunday Closing Laws, which required businesses
to close on Sunday.81 In Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley,82 the Court
conceded Pennsylvania’s closing laws under Section 4651
still contain some traces of the early religious influence. The 1939
statute refers to Sunday as “the Lord’s day”; but it is included in
the general section entitled, “Offenses Against Public Policy,
Economy and Health.” [Section] 4651 uses the term “Sabbath
Day” and refers to the other days of the week as “secular days.”
But almost every other statutory section simply uses the word
“Sunday” and contains no language with religious connotation.
It would seem that those traces that have remained are simply the
result of legislative oversight in failing to remove them. Section
4651 was re-enacted in 1959 and happened to retain the religious
language; many other statutory sections, passed both before and
after this date, omit it.
. . . .
. . . [W]e find that the 1939 statute was recently amended to
permit all healthful and recreational exercises and activities on
Sunday. This is not consistent with aiding church attendance; in
fact, it might be deemed inconsistent. And the statutory section, . . .
the constitutionality of which is immediately before us, was pro-
moted principally by the representatives of labor and business
interests. Those Pennsylvania legislators who favored the bill
specifically disavowed any religious purpose for its enactment
but stated instead that economics required its passage.83
is the Constitution’s textual embodiment of this idea of political liberalism: the basic purpose
of including the Establishment Clause within the Bill of Rights was to prohibit the new
federal government from developing an allegiance to any of the various religious belief-
systems that then existed, or that might come to exist, within American culture.”); see also
GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at 62–71 (chapter entitled “Restraint as to Religious Grounds:
Separation of Church and State”); SCHWEBER, supra note 24, at 184; SUNSTEIN, supra note
35, at 17. Sunstein argues that American constitutional law is indeed about a “republic of
reasons.” Importantly, the “required reason must count as a public regarding one. Government
cannot appeal to private interest alone.” Id. See generally BEDI, supra note 18.
81 See, e.g., Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
82 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
83 Id. at 594–95 (footnotes omitted).
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The Court held that these Sunday Closing Laws no longer had a religious character,
but sought to offer the weekly laborer a day of rest and repose to improve overall
productivity.84
B. Bans on Gay Marriage
Bans on gay marriage are inapposite and are not similar to Sunday Closing Laws.
They, in fact, rest on explicit religious beliefs about the nature and meaning of mar-
riage. This provides an under-theorized framework by which to analyze bans on gay
marriage and, in turn, marriage itself. No court has analyzed such bans in light of the
Establishment Clause, let alone struck them down on the basis of it.85 But if we take
this approach seriously in challenging bans on gay marriage, this reveals problems
with marriage itself.
Consider that Perry v. Schwarzenegger,86 the first federal decision to strike
down a ban on gay marriage, recognized the relationship between morals legislation
and religious neutrality87:
A state’s interest in an enactment must of course be secular in
nature. The state does not have an interest in enforcing private
moral or religious beliefs without an accompanying secular pur-
pose. Perhaps recognizing that Proposition 8 must advance a
secular purpose to be constitutional, proponents abandoned pre-
vious arguments from the campaign that had asserted the moral
superiority of opposite-sex couples.88
84 See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607 (“[W]e cannot find a State without power to provide
a weekly respite from all labor and, at the same time, to set one day of the week apart from
the others as a day of rest, repose, recreation and tranquility—a day when the hectic tempo
of everyday existence ceases and a more pleasant atmosphere is created, a day which all
members of the family and community have the opportunity to spend and enjoy together, a
day on which people may visit friends and relatives who are not available during working
days, a day when the weekly laborer may best regenerate himself. This is particularly true
in this day and age of increasing state concern with public welfare legislation.”).
85 The Superior Court of the District of Columbia in 1992 dismissed the Establishment
Clause challenge to a ban on same-sex marriage. See Dean v. District of Columbia, No. 90-
13892, 1992 WL 685364, at *4–8 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 1992) (holding that such a claim
was totally frivolous), aff’d, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1995). There seems to be only one
federal case that even indirectly referenced the Establishment Clause, at least in part, in ana-
lyzing the constitutionality of bans on gay marriage. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp.
2d 921, 930–31 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (striking down state amendment banning gay marriage),
vacated and remanded by Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013).
86 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
87 See generally id.
88 Id. at 930–31 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003); Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)).
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Schwarzenegger cites Lawrence and an Establishment Clause case in invalidating
Proposition 8, the California initiative that amended the state constitution to prohibit
gay marriage.89 Schwarzenegger recognizes that such a ban was not initially advanced
on secular or temporal grounds—like the current justification for Sunday Closing
Laws—but on religious grounds regarding the meaning of marriage.90
According to the Pew Research Center, many religious groups object to same-
sex marriage on precisely such grounds.91 For instance, the United States Conference
of Catholic Bishops justifies its position on grounds that “marriage is a faithful, ex-
clusive, and lifelong union between one man and one woman. . . . Moreover, we be-
lieve the natural institution of marriage has been blessed and elevated by Christ Jesus
to the dignity of a sacrament.”92 Stephen Macedo argues that “moral and political
thinkers fail to provide a reasoned defense for discrimination against” same-sex
marriage.93 This is why Gordon Babst characterizes a prohibition on same-sex mar-
riage as a “shadow establishment” drawing from the constitutional ban on establish-
ing religion.94 Legal scholars who challenge prohibitions on same-sex marriage rarely
invoke the Establishment Clause.95 Gary J. Simson is one of the few scholars who,
argues that “[l]aws prohibiting same-sex marriage are extremely difficult to under-
stand in secular terms and extremely easy to understand in religious terms.”96
The problem, of course, is that those states that do ban same-sex marriage will
not admit that religious reasons are doing the underlying work.97 In fact, this is why
89 Id. at 931. For an argument about the novel nature of this argument that draws
from Lawrence and the Establishment Clause, see generally Clifford J. Rosky, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage Law, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 913 (2011).
90 See Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 931 (mentioning the “asserted . . . moral
superiority of opposite-sex couples” that were proponents of Proposition 8).
91 David Masci & Michael Lipka, Where Christian Churches, Other Religions Stand on
Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank
/2015/120/21/where-Christian-churches-stand-on-gay-marriage [https://perma.cc/8JES-LY68]
(“Many of the largest U.S. religious institutions have remained firmly against allowing same-
sex marriage . . . .”).
92 News Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, U.S. Catholic Bishops’ Adminis-
trative Committee Calls for Protection of Marriage (Sept. 10, 2003), http://www.usccb.org
/news/2003/03-179.cfm [http://perma.cc/K3BA-VV4B].
93 Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261, 264
(1995).
94 See GORDON ALBERT BABST, LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, MARRIAGE, AND SEXUAL
ORIENTATION: A CONTEMPORARY CASE FOR DIS-ESTABLISHMENT 2 (2002) (defining “shadow
establishment” as “an impermissible expression of sectarian preference in the law that is
unreasonable in the light of the nation’s constitutional commitments to all its citizens” (em-
phasis omitted)).
95 See Gary J. Simson, Religion by Any Other Name? Prohibitions on Same-Sex Marriage
and the Limits of the Establishment Clause, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 132, 147–48 (2012).
96 Id. at 147.
97 See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Same-Sex Marriage and the Establishment Clause,
54 VILL. L. REV. 617 (2009).
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the proponents of Proposition 8 specifically refused to invoke such reasons in justi-
fying such a ban in Schwarzenegger.98 Rather, proponents have unsurprisingly sought
to justify such bans by appealing to arguments of responsible procreation99 and
preserving the “traditional” institution of marriage.100 It is relatively easy to see that
these reasons fail as legal justifications. They are justifications made in bad faith,
revealing that bans on gay marriage rest on religious rationales.
Consider the possible reason that the state would limit marriage only to opposite-
sex couples: to promote a stable environment for the procreation or the raising of
children. As I suggest in Beyond Race, Sex, and Sexual Orientation:
If these concerns are indeed relevant to marriage, why does the
state not at all regulate marriage licenses in light of them? After
all, the state does not ascertain whether an opposite-sex couple
is fit to raise a child before issuing a license. Those who profess
no desire to raise a child or even to procreate are not denied a mar-
riage license. Two elderly individuals past their child-rearing age
may just as easily obtain such a license as two younger individuals
ready to start a family. Marriage and the begetting and raising of
children are distinct issues even for those who currently protest
same-sex marriage.101
98 See 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997–1002 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), struck down by Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), explicitly
justifies limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples on religious grounds. The House Report
on DOMA contained language justifying the legislation on religious grounds:
For many Americans, there is to this issue of marriage an overtly moral
or religious aspect that cannot be divorced from the practicalities. It is
true, of course, that the civil act of marriage is separate from the recog-
nition and blessing of that act by a religious institution. But the fact that
there are distinct religious and civil components of marriage does not
mean that the two do not intersect. Civil laws that permit only hetero-
sexual marriage reflect and honor a collective moral judgment about
human sexuality. This judgment entails both moral disapproval of homo-
sexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports
with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2919–20 (1996) (footnote omitted).
99 See DAVID BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 3 (2007) (“What a child wants
and needs more than anything else are the mother and father who together made the child,
who love the child, and who love each other.”).
100 See generally WHAT’S THE HARM?: DOES LEGALIZING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE REALLY
HARM INDIVIDUALS, FAMILIES OR SOCIETY? (Lynn D. Wardle ed., 2008).
101 BEDI, supra note 18, at 212. See generally Courtney G. Joslin, Searching for Harm:
Same-Sex Marriage and the Well-Being of Children, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 81 (2011).
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In clarifying the nature of this union with regards to procreation, Obergefell states:
That is not to say the right to marry is less meaningful for those
who do not or cannot have children. An ability, desire, or prom-
ise to procreate is not and has not been a prerequisite for a valid
marriage in any State. In light of precedent protecting the right
of a married couple not to procreate, it cannot be said the Court
or the States have conditioned the right to marry on the capacity
or commitment to procreate. The constitutional marriage right
has many aspects, of which childbearing is only one.102
Simply put, marriage is not just a “meaningful” union for those who seek to pro-
create.103
Obergefell also repeatedly cites Turner v. Safley,104 a decision that specifically
considers the relationship between procreation and marriage.105 Safley informs the
bad faith charge of the procreative objection to same-sex marriage.106 In Safley, the
Missouri Division of Corrections promulgated various penal regulations.107 One of
these regulations prohibited inmates from marrying unless they first received ap-
proval from the superintendent—approval that should be given only “when there are
102 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
103 The California Supreme Court also rejected this kind of justification when it invali-
dated that state’s prohibition on same-sex marriage:
[T]he constitutional right to marry never has been viewed as the sole
preserve of individuals who are physically capable of having children.
Men and women who desire to raise children with a loved one in a rec-
ognized family but who are physically unable to conceive a child with
their loved one never have been excluded from the right to marry. . . .
A person who is physically incapable of bearing children still has the
potential to become a parent and raise a child through adoption or
through means of assisted reproduction, and the constitutional right to
marry ensures the individual the opportunity to raise children in an offi-
cially recognized family with the person with whom the individual has
chosen to share his or her life. Thus, although an important purpose
underlying marriage may be to channel procreation into a stable family
relationship, that purpose cannot be viewed as limiting the constitutional
right to marry to couples who are capable of biologically producing a
child together.
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 431 (Cal. 2008); see also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (invalidating Massachusetts’s ban on same-sex mar-
riage under a rational review analysis).
104 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
105 See generally id. (holding that an inmate marriage regulation was facially invalid).
106 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589, 2598.
107 See 482 U.S. at 81–82.
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compelling reasons to do so.”108 The Division of Corrections stated: “only a pregnancy
or the birth of an illegitimate child would be considered a compelling reason.”109 Why
does pregnancy or birth constitute a compelling reason but not love, commitment, or
the wide variety of benefits attached to marriage?110 Marriage is primarily about pro-
creation and about raising children, or so the prison regulation here implies.111
By invalidating this prison regulation, the Court makes clear that procreation is
not necessary to justify the state’s role in conferring the status of marriage.112 As I
argue in Beyond Race, Sex, and Sexual Orientation:
The Court invalidate[d] this regulation concluding that “[m]any
important attributes of marriage remain . . . after taking into ac-
count the limitations imposed by prison life . . . [including the]
expressions of emotional support and public commitment [that]
are an important and significant aspect of the marital relation-
ship.” . . . In fact, Safley rehearse[d] the legal benefits that arise
from marriage including “the receipt of government benefits” such
as Social Security and “property rights.” An inmate may very well
seek to marry for these reasons, reasons that have nothing to do
with procreation. Procreation is not necessary to avail oneself of
the institution of marriage. . . . So as a constitutional matter, con-
cerns of procreation and hence the raising of children cannot un-
derlie a prohibition on same-sex marriage just as they could not
underlie limiting an inmate’s ability to marry.113
That means that there is no necessary connection between the fundamental right to
marry and raising children.
Along with the argument for responsible procreation is the concern about pre-
serving traditional, opposite-sex marriages. This explains why those who defend
prohibitions on same-sex marriage are sometimes willing to permit gays and les-
bians to gain civil union status but not full-blown marriage. In Baker v. State,114 the
Vermont Supreme Court gave the legislature the option of granting same-sex couples
marriage or civil union status.115 At that time, the Vermont legislature chose the latter
108 Id. at 82 (citation omitted).
109 Id.
110 See id. at 95–96.
111 See id. at 96.
112 See id. at 82.
113 BEDI, supra note 18, at 213–14 (quoting Safley, 482 U.S. at 95–96).
114 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
115 See id. at 887 (allowing the statutory scheme to stay in place for a reasonable time to
implement equalizing legislation).
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(it ultimately passed legislation to grant marriage in 2009).116 The civil union law
said in part:
While a system of civil unions does not bestow the status of civil
marriage, it does satisfy the requirements of the Common Bene-
fits Clause. Changes in the way significant legal relationships
are established under the constitution should be approached
carefully, combining respect for the community and cultural in-
stitutions most affected with a commitment to the constitutional
rights involved.117
But to what does this concern for the “respect for the community” and its “cultural
institutions” amount?118 There are, as I conclude in Beyond Race, Sex, and Sexual
Orientation, two possible answers, one that is circular and the other—like its pro-
creative counterpart—proffered in bad faith:
First, it seems circular to justify a prohibition on same-sex mar-
riage on grounds of tradition or culture. This is exactly what is
often done. For instance, the official website for Proposition 8
says that “The [California] Supreme Court’s decision to legalize
same-sex marriage did not just overturn the will of California
voters; it also redefined marriage for the rest of society. . . . This
decision has far-reaching consequences.” In explaining what
these far-reaching consequences” actually are, the Proposition
8 supporters go on to say that by “saying that a marriage is
between ‘any two persons’ rather than between a man and a
woman, the Court decision has opened the door to any kind of
‘marriage.’ This undermines the value of marriage altogether at
a time when we should be restoring marriage, not undermining
it.” Thus, the alleged bad consequence of redefining marriage is
that marriage will now be undermined because the definition
will have changed. This is patently circular. Of course, changing
the definition of marriage will undoubtedly undermine the tradi-
tional meaning of marriage.119
116 See Act of Apr. 26, 2000, No. 91, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72 [hereinafter An Act Re-
lating to Civil Unions] (codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–1207 (2018))
(providing for civil unions in Vermont); see also An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and
Recognize Equality in Civil Marriage, No. 3, 2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves 33 (codified at VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2018)) (providing legal equality to all civil marriage).
117 An Act Relating to Civil Unions, supra note 116, §1(10).
118 See id.; see also BEDI, supra note 18, at 214.
119 BEDI, supra note 18, at 214–15 (footnote omitted).
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Simply suggesting that the state has always done something a particular way is
not a constitutionally sufficient reason, on its own, to maintain the practice. Again,
in Lawrence, the Court invalidated sodomy laws, rejecting mere tradition as a legiti-
mate reason for affirming such legislation.120 The Court held that “the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as im-
moral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”121
Lawrence goes on to make clear that “neither history nor tradition could save a law
prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.”122
Obergefell explicitly rejects mere appeal to history in interpreting “constitutional
provisions that set forth broad principles” like “due process” and “equal protection.”123
Citing Lawrence, Kennedy proclaims that “[h]istory and tradition guide and disci-
pline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.”124 This “respects our history
and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the present.”125
In addition to the tradition or cultural argument to justify bans on gay marriage:
[P]erhaps the concern for detractors is that same-sex marriage
will destroy the institution of marriage for opposite-sex couples
or lead to more divorces among them. . . . As William Eskridge
notes, in European countries such as Denmark and Sweden where
same-sex unions have been legally recognized in some fashion
120 See 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
121 Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
122 Id. at 577–78 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
123 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
124 Id. at 2598 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572).
125 Id. Kenji Yoshino argues that Obergefell undermined the principle in Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that there was no substantive due process right
to assisted suicide), that a due process right be “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’” id. at 720–21 (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality
opinion); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)), with a “‘careful description’
of the asserted fundamental liberty interest,” id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302
(1993)). Yoshino, supra note 57, at 162–69 (“Obergefell transformed the role Glucksberg
assigned to tradition.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution:
A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1161, 1174 (1988) (stating that it is implausible to say that the Equal Protection Clause is
nothing other than a “sober second thought to legislation or the defense of tradition against
pent-up majorities”). But see Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of
Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 309 (2011) (arguing that tradition may be
sufficient to pass the most deferential rational review standard). Forde-Mazrui concludes that
benefits that may accrue to preserving tradition are “maintaining predictability and settled
expectations, reinforcing the community identity of those who define themselves based in
part on the tradition, and avoiding unintended consequences of change.” Id.
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since 1989, there has been no adverse effect on the institution of
marriage for heterosexuals. If anything, the effect has been posi-
tive. This trend is borne out in recent numbers from the Division
of Vital Statistics at the Centers for Disease Control. Massachusetts
began issuing same-sex marriage licenses in 2004. The divorce
rate in 2007 for the state was 2.3 per 1000 people, which was less
than the average rate for the rest of the country. In fact, all the
states that permit[ted] same-sex marriage ha[d] a lower rate of
divorce than the average of the others.126
Obergefell also questions the causal nature of this objection, saying that it rests on
“a counterintuitive view of opposite-sex couple’s decisionmaking processes regarding
marriage and parenthood.”127 Obergefell goes on to state: “Decisions about whether
to marry and raise children are based on many personal, romantic, and practical con-
siderations; and it is unrealistic to conclude that an opposite-sex couple would choose
not to marry simply because same-sex couples may do so.”128 Obergefell concludes:
The respondents have not shown a foundation for the conclusion
that allowing same-sex marriage will cause the harmful outcomes
they describe. Indeed, with respect to this asserted basis for ex-
cluding same-sex couples from the right to marry, it is appropriate
to observe these cases involve only the rights of two consenting
adults whose marriages would pose no risk of harm to themselves
or third parties.129
More importantly, this kind of justification for a prohibition on same-sex mar-
riage cannot be made in good faith. Those who support such a prohibition on these
grounds do not seek to prevent divorce or even the number of times an individual
may marry. It is revealing that those who supported referenda like as Proposition 8
did not also seek to place a ballot measure that would have made divorce more dif-
ficult or would have prevented individuals from marrying more than twice.130 If the
126 BEDI, supra note 18, at 215–16. These rates have stayed consistent since the publica-
tion of Beyond Race, Sex, and Sexual Orientation. The divorce rate in 2014 for Massachusetts
was 2.7 per 1,000 people, which was less than the 3.2 average rate for the rest of the country.
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DIVORCE
RATES BY STATE: 1990, 1995, AND 1999–2014, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/state
_divorce_rates_90_95_and_99-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9ZA-VBK8] (last visited Apr. 12,
2018); National Marriage and Divorce Trends, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce
_tables.htm [https://perma.cc/EA4L-Q78S] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
127 135 S. Ct. at 2607.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See, e.g., Frederick Liu & Stephen Macedo, The Federal Marriage Amendment and
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concern is with preserving marriage, the ability to procure a divorce is the most
glaring destructive force threatening the institution.
In fact, James Q. Wilson suggests that the adoption by states of a regime of no-
fault divorce has undermined marriages.131 No-fault divorce laws permit a spouse to
procure a divorce for any reason or no reason at all.132 As I suggest in Beyond Race,
Sex, and Sexual Orientation:
All fifty states have incorporated some provision for no fault di-
vorce. So even states that prohibit[ed] same-sex marriage permit
no fault divorce. How [could] these states simultaneously proffer
the protection of marriage as a justification for limiting marriage
if they do not limit the number of times an individual may marry
or restrict their ability to procure a divorce? This . . . means that
reasons related to procreation, divorce, or preserving opposite sex
marriages are made in bad faith. If the concern is with undermin-
ing opposite-sex marriage or increasing the frequency of children
born out of wedlock, states should aim to repeal no fault divorce
or [limit] the number of times an individual may marry. These
policies straightforwardly damage the institution of marriage, mak-
ing it perhaps less likely that individuals will desire to marry.133
Once these other justifications are seen as inapplicable, it is difficult to deny the
religious rationale underlying gay marriage bans. In fact, in his Obergefell dissent,
Chief Justice Roberts recognizes the religious nature of such bans: “Today’s decision,
for example, creates serious questions about religious liberty. Many good and decent
people oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith, and their freedom to exercise
religion is—unlike the right imagined by the majority—actually spelled out in the
Constitution.”134 Concerns about religious liberty that have arisen after Obergefell—
where, for instance, individuals may be forced to partake in a gay marriage in violation
of their religious conscience135—reveal that the bans on such marriage invariably rest
the Strange Evolution of the Conservative Case Against Gay Marriage, 38 PS: POL. SCI. &
POL. 211, 212 (2005).
131 See JAMES. Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: HOW OUR CULTURE HAS WEAK-
ENED FAMILIES 161–63 (2002).
132 No-Fault Divorce, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/no-fault_divorce
[http://perma.cc/4CJK-MEYN] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
133 BEDI, supra note 18, at 216–17 (citing KARLA B. HACKSTAFF, MARRIAGE IN A CUL-
TURE OF DIVORCE 28 (1999)).
134 135 S. Ct. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
135 See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015)
(holding a Christian baker cannot refuse service to gay couples seeking to marry as required
by the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (June 26, 2017)
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on religious reasons. Justice Scalia, dissenting in Obergefell, goes out of his way to
say that there is not a “single evangelical Christian” on the Court, even though as a
group they “comprise[ ] about one quarter of Americans.”136 The implication being:
it is precisely those religious beliefs that underlie gay marriage bans. Once we realize
this, the Establishment Clause carries serious constitutional weight as an important
way to invalidate such bans.
C. Marriage Versus Civil Union
If the Establishment Clause invalidates bans on gay marriage, this suggests that
marriage itself may be a spiritual rather than secular union. Central to this claim is the
difference between marriage and civil unions. The distinction between a marriage and
civil union became important as a result of Baker v. State,137 one of the first decisions
striking down prohibitions on same-sex marriage. The Vermont Supreme Court invali-
dated such prohibitions under the Vermont Constitution.138 The court held that by re-
fusing to provide legal recognition to same-sex couples, the state violated the Common
Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution—the state’s equal protection analogue to
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.139 Finding a constitutional
violation, the court gave the legislature two options to remedy it—either permit same-
sex couples to marry, or provide them civil unions or domestic partnerships:
We hold only that plaintiffs are entitled under . . . the Vermont
Constitution to obtain the same benefits and protections afforded
by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples. We do not pur-
port to infringe upon the prerogatives of the Legislature to craft
an appropriate means of addressing this constitutional mandate,
other than to note that the record here refers to a number of po-
tentially constitutional statutory schemes from other jurisdictions.
These include what are typically referred to as “domestic partner-
ship” or “registered partnership” acts, which generally establish
an alternative legal status to marriage for same-sex couples, im-
pose similar formal requirements and limitations, create a parallel
licensing or registration scheme, and extend all or most of the same
rights and obligations provided by the law to married partners.140
(No. 16-111); In re Klein, Nos. 44-14 & 45-14, 2015 WL 4868796 (OR BOLI July 2, 2015)
(fining Christian-run bakery $135,000 for refusing to serve gay couples seeking to marry).
136 135 S. Ct. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
138 Id. at 867.
139 See id.
140 Id. at 886.
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The legislature opted for civil unions or domestic partnerships.141 This was seen
as a less controversial move, precisely because it withheld the all-important status
of marriage.142 In explaining its decision to pass the Vermont Civil Union Statute of
2000, the legislature acknowledged that
[w]hile a system of civil unions does not bestow the status of civil
marriage, it does satisfy the requirements of the Common Benefits
Clause. Changes in the way significant legal relationships are es-
tablished under the constitution should be approached carefully,
combining respect for the community and cultural institutions most
affected with a commitment to the constitutional rights involved.143
One journalist covering the Vermont decision summed up the reaction of an un-
named minister as follows: “‘I don’t care what people do,’ [the minister] insisted. ‘Just
don’t call it marriage. It can’t be marriage.’”144 Even though gay couples would receive
the same benefits, responsibilities, and privileges that come with marriage, they would
not receive the label of “marriage.”145 Vermont granted all couples the status of “mar-
riage” in 2009.146 The label of “marriage” is important because it adds something to
the relevant union, something above and beyond the material benefits accompanying
civil unions. In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,147 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts invalidated the state’s prohibition on same-sex marriage,
making clear that “[t]angible as well as intangible benefits flow from marriage.”148
This “intangible benefit” illuminates the fact that marriage is not just a contract
where the two parties receive a set of material benefits.149 Marriage places two indi-
viduals in a legal relationship or status that is not simply a private issue because the
state defines and regulates that status.150 In Maynard v. Hill,151 the Court held that a
141 See Liz Halloran, How Vermont’s ‘Civil’ War Fueled the Gay Marriage Movement,
NPR (Mar. 23, 2013, 2:24 PM), https://www.npr.org/2013/03/27/174651233/how-vermonts
-civil-war-fueled-the-gay-marriage-movement/ [https://web.archive.org/web/201703161548
19/http://www.npr.org/2013/03/27/174651233/how-vermonts-civil-war-fueled-the-gay
-marriage-movement/] (describing Governor Howard Dean’s pledge to veto any legislation
giving full marriage).
142 See id.
143 An Act Relating to Civil Unions, supra note 116, §1(10).
144 Adrian Walker, Give Partners the Right to Marry, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 9, 2000, at B1.
145 With Veto Overrides, Vermont Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage, CNN (Apr. 7, 2009,
12:59 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/07/same.sex.marriage/ [http://perma.cc
/Y9CB-P4YB].
146 Id.
147 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
148 Id. at 955.
149 See id. at 995 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
150 Cf. David B. Cruz, “Just Don’t Call It Marriage”: The First Amendment and Marriage
as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 980 n.288 (2001).
151 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
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state legislature may dissolve the bonds of marriage.152 Justice Stephen Field, writing
for the Court, famously reasoned that marriage is a kind of status.153 Marriage is
declared a civil contract for certain purposes, but it is not thereby
made synonymous with the word contract employed in the com-
mon law or statutes. . . . The relation is always regulated by gov-
ernment. It is more than a contract. It requires certain acts of the
parties to constitute marriage independent of and beyond the con-
tract. It partakes more of the character of an institution regulated
and controlled by public authority, upon principles of public
policy, for the benefit of the community.154
A run-of-the-mill contract, like an employment contract, in contrast, is generally not
subject to heavy regulation.155 The common law certainly permits individuals to en-
force contractual obligations through state courts, but an employment contract itself
does not create the same kind of status.156 Consider that parties to such a contract
may terminate the agreement without involving the state.157 This is not the case with
marriage. Marriage is a civil status precisely because the state regulates it. Before
states permitted same-sex marriage, gay couples often availed themselves of the
common law of contract to formalize issues such as inheritance and property.158
In turn, the distinction between status and contract has been crucial in the debate
over same-sex marriage. As Janet Halley points out, “advocates and opponents [of
152 See generally id.
153 See id. at 212–13.
154 Id. Alongside this view of marriage as a status is a conflicting one that considers it like
any other contract—a view that was also present in the nineteenth century. See generally
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1985).
155 See generally Norman D. Bishara et al., An Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition
Clauses and Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2015)
(discussing the enforceability of certain types of employment contracts).
156 See, e.g., id. at 48 (discussing the inability to have noncompete clauses enforced in
California state courts).
157 See id. at 33 (“[A]t-will contracts . . . have [an] effective length[ ] of zero.”).
158 See, e.g., Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian
Family Values by a “Simulacrum of Marriage,” 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1712 (1998)
(answering the question of to “what extent can the legitimate family values of gay people be
protected by means other than marriage?”); Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for
Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. L. REV. 1107, 1137–44
(1996) (listing valid contracts permitted before same-sex marriages, such as (1) estate planning
tools; (2) cohabitation contracts; and (3) quasi-marriage contracts through domestic partner-
ship legislation); Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners
and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 511 (1990) (analyzing private, contractual
options for lesbian couples).
2018] AN ILLIBERAL UNION 1109
same-sex marriage have] converge[d] on an image of marriage as status.”159 The
debate over gay marriage is not about whether marriage ought to have this status,
only which kinds of couples may avail themselves of it.160 On one side, are propo-
nents of same-sex marriage who sought to permit gays and lesbians affirmation of
their relationships with this status.161 On the other side are the detractors who sought
to protect traditional marriage from alteration.162 Joseph Singer, writing positively
in light of the decision in Goodridge, makes clear: “After all, marriage is not just an
ordinary contract; it is a status conferred by state officials who issue a license and
conduct a ceremony in which they state: ‘By the authority invested in me by the
[state], I hereby declare you to be married.’”163 Citing Maynard, Kennedy in
Obergefell affirmed the nature of marriage as a status, explaining that marriage is
“the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress.”164 Marriage, as Kennedy goes on to say, has long been “a
great public institution, giving character to our whole civil polity.”165 Marriage, for
Kennedy, is “transcendent.”166 Although marriage importantly entails material bene-
fits, it is also a “significant status,”167 conferring “nobility and dignity.”168 This is the
intangible feature that comes with the label of “marriage.” Kennedy concludes that
“[s]ame-sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and
seek fulfillment in its highest meaning.”169
“Civil marriage,” according to David Cruz, “is a unique symbolic or expressive
resource, usable to communicate a variety of messages to one’s spouse and others,
and thereby to facilitate people’s constitution of personal identity.”170 Cruz criticizes
civil unions, like the one first proposed in Vermont, for denying “same-sex couples
the expressive potential of civil marriage.”171 This is why Tamara Metz contends that
marriage “functions as a special symbolic resource that individuals can use to say
159 Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage (I): From Status/Contract to the Marriage
System, 6 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 4 (2010).
160 Id. at 4–11 (explaining “a new convergence” of same-sex marriage advocates who seek
to attain the status of marriage).
161 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
162 See, e.g., supra note 144 and accompanying text.
163 Joseph William Singer, Same-Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of
Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 5 (2005). In Singer’s article the phrase “Commonwealth
of Massachusetts” is used in lieu of the word “state,” but this has been changed here for
purposes of allowing the phrase to apply to all states.
164 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
165 Id. (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 213).
166 Id. at 2594.
167 Id. at 2601.
168 Id. at 2594.
169 Id. at 2602.
170 Cruz, supra note 150, at 928.
171 Id.
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something about who they are to themselves, their partners, and their communities.”172
It functions as an affirmation of the moral worthiness of this kind of union.173 This
is why gays and lesbians do not merely seek to be civilly unionized.
The status of being married does something more. Marriage, as Metz says, is “a
unique kind of expressive good, the value of which exceeds the sum of the delineable
benefits and burdens that attach to it.”174 It is an ethical union, one that treats the
whole as greater than the parts.175 But it is precisely this kind of union, according to
Metz, that exceeds the traditional regulatory bounds of the liberal state176:
Traditionally, liberals have treated the commands of the state as
limiting action (not belief) for the narrow purpose of ensuring
social order, protecting citizens from harm, and guaranteeing po-
litical fairness. Generally, the state confers legal status for instru-
mental convenience, not to alter self-understanding in any deep
and enduring way. The familiar idea behind the limited state is
that freedom consists, in large part, in individuals being free from
interference to live according to their own design.177
Given this view of the liberal state, conferring the status of marriage seems to con-
found it. In declaring individuals married, the state, as Metz argues, alters self-
understanding.178 She calls this the “expressive” or “constitutive” part of marriage.179
This informs Justice Kennedy’s description of marriage, as a “dynamic” union that
“becomes greater than just the two persons.”180
Drawing on Goodridge, Michael Sandel draws such a comparison between bans
on gay marriage and marriage itself181:
As if to avoid entering into the moral and religious controversy
over homosexuality, [Goodridge] describes the moral issue before
the court in liberal terms—as a matter of autonomy and freedom
of choice. The exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is
172 METZ, supra note 8, at 89.
173 See id. (describing the status as a “publicly created good that can be deployed by its
recipients”).
174 Id. at 36.
175 See id.
176 Id. at 119 (arguing that a true liberal state should be “more distant and uninvolved with
the beliefs of its citizens”).
177 Id. at 115 (footnote omitted).
178 See id. at 89.
179 Id. at 89–94.
180 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
181 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 257 (2009).
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incompatible with “respect for individual autonomy and equality
under law,” [Goodridge proclaims]. . . . But autonomy and free-
dom of choice are insufficient to justify a right to same-sex mar-
riage. If government were truly neutral on the moral worth of all
voluntary intimate relationships, then the state would have no
grounds for limiting marriage to two persons; consensual polyg-
amous partnerships would also qualify. In fact, if the state really
wanted to be neutral, and respect whatever choices individuals
wished to make, it would have to . . . get out of the business of
conferring recognition on any marriages.182
This is the tension that the distinction between civil union and marriage reveals. For
if it is problematic for the state to privilege heterosexuality over homosexuality in
its conferring of marriage licenses, the state would be hard pressed to privilege being
married over being unmarried as this label itself also rests on such premises.
D. Defining Religion Broadly
The foregoing analysis reveals that marriage may violate the Establishment
Clause. Admittedly, although it is relatively easy to see that bans on gay marriage
are based on religious beliefs—even a particular Judeo-Christian definition of
marriage—the religious nature of marriage itself may not be so obvious.183 Because
marriage entails an intangible ethical quality that a mere civil union does not, it
illuminates its religious character. Important to this argument is adopting a broad
rather than narrow definition of religion. Now there is an ongoing constitutional
debate about the meaning of religion.184 This Article does not seek to resolve this
182 Id. (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003)).
See also BRAKE, supra note 8, at 133: “Same-sex marriage advocates have argued that it is
unjust to define marriage legally on the basis of contested moral views regarding same-sex
activity.” Brake agrees, but argues that such advocates have “failed to follow the implications
of such neutral or political liberal reasoning to the extreme conclusion” where we question
marriage itself. Id.
183 Cf. Simson, supra note 95, at 152 n.72 (“[H]eterosexuality better comports with tra-
ditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.” (citations omitted)).
184 See, e.g., George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional
Definition of “Religion,” 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983) (pondering how “religion” should be
defined); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV.
753, 753 (1984) (suggesting “that in both free exercise and establishment cases, courts should
decide whether something is religious by comparison with the indisputably religious, in light
of the particular legal problem involved”); Eduardo Peñalver, Note, The Concept of Religion,
107 YALE L.J. 791, 794 (1997) (advocating to construe “‘religion’ under the First Amendment
in its evolving, everyday sense”); Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The Struggle to
Define Religion Under the First Amendment and the Contributions and Insights of Other
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debate in any definitive way; it only suggests one way marriage could indeed be
understood as based on religious precepts.
In United States v. Seeger,185 the Court extensively analyzed the definition of
religion. Even though that case concerned the interpretation of the federal conscien-
tious objector statute and not the Constitution, it provides ample evidence of a broad
view of religion.186 In that case, Seeger sought to qualify for a conscientious objector
status under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which “exempts from
combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States those persons
who by reason of their religious training and belief are conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form.”187
Seeger maintained “that his ‘skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God’ did
‘not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything whatsoever’; that his was a ‘belief
in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in
a purely ethical creed.’”188 The Court accepted Seeger’s argument, concluding that
his belief was indeed a religious one.189 The Court, accordingly, defined religious
belief broadly:
Within that phrase would come all sincere religious beliefs which
are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else
is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent. The
test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful
belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel
to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the
exemption comes within the statutory definition.190
A belief that functions as a “parallel to that filled by . . . God” is therefore religious.191
The Court approvingly cites a leader in the “Ethical Culture Movement,”192 who states:
Instead of positing a personal God, whose existence man can
neither prove nor disprove, the ethical concept is founded on hu-
man experience. It is anthropocentric, not theocentric. Religion,
Disciplines of Study Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and Anthropology,
83 N.D. L. REV. 123, 126 (2007) (exploring from many vantage points “the word ‘religion’
in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution”).
185 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
186 See id. at 166–72.
187 Id. at 164–65.
188 Id. at 166 (citations omitted).
189 Id. at 165–66.
190 Id. at 176.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 182.
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for all the various definitions that have been given of it, must
surely mean the devotion of man to the highest ideal that he can
conceive.193
This means that beliefs corresponding to such ideals are religious ones. In Welsh v.
United States,194 another exemption case, the Court went so far as to say that “opposi-
tion to war stem[ming] from . . . moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is
right and wrong” ultimately constitutes a religious belief against war.195
If we adopt such a comprehensive definition of religion, marriage itself turns out
to rest on religious beliefs and triggers Establishment Clause concerns. The underly-
ing constitutional issue in Obergefell is not simply about the denial of the material
benefits that come with marriage. Kennedy’s concern is that marriage also comes
with intangible advantages including dignity and nobility, advantages that inform
the ethical nature of the union.196 By denying this kind of status to same-sex couples,
Kennedy asserts that the state demeans gays and lesbians by “lock[ing] them out of
a central institution of the Nation’s society.”197 It leaves such couples without the
ability to “aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its
highest meaning.”198
This language of “transcendent” points to the religious, à la Seeger and Welsh,
nature of marriage. Obergefell says that “[m]arriage is sacred to those who live by
their religions and offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secu-
lar realm.”199 This notion of “unique fulfillment” corresponds to a broad view of
religion.200 That is, in making clear that marriage “embodies the highest ideals of
love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family,” Kennedy captures the ethical ideal
embodied in Seeger’s successful religious exemption claim.201
Marriage is an ethical—even metaphysical union—precisely because it, as Metz
contends, “alter[s] self-understanding in any deep and enduring way.”202 This is why
Metz concludes that the state goes beyond its “limited” role of providing mere in-
strumental benefits in marrying individuals.203 In doing so, Metz argues the state
“assumes [through marriage laws] the role of ethical authority, . . . violating the type
193 Id. at 183 (quoting DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY, ETHICS AS A RELIGION 95 (1951)).
194 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
195 Id. at 340.
196 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (stating that marriage “allows two
people to find a life that could not be found alone”).
197 Id. at 2602.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 2594.
200 See id.
201 See id. at 2608.
202 METZ, supra note 8, at 115.
203 See id. at 130.
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of neutrality necessary for the state to secure liberty and equality in a diverse polity
such as ours.”204
The emphasis on how the very act of excluding gay couples demeans them
makes sense because Kennedy ascribes so much moral significance to marriage.
Marriage, unlike a civil union consecrates a relationship with mystical overtones—it
is, after all, “transcendent.”205 Denying gays and lesbians entry into this status rightly
violates their dignity. This informs the ethical nature of marriage, revealing that the
civil institution is indeed based on religious beliefs, broadly construed. This revela-
tion, in turn, poses a possible violation under the Establishment Clause, which requires
that laws and policies have a secular purpose.206 Whereas Sunday Closing Laws have
lost their religious character,207 marriage has not.
One scholar of marriage law even characterizes the Vermont Civil Union Statute
of 2000 as a “secular alternative to marriage for same-sex couples.”208 This implies
that unlike a civil union, marriage is not simply based on a secular purpose of pro-
viding certain material benefits to those who undertake it. Perry Dane argues that the
“‘secular’ and ‘religious’ meanings . . . of marriage are so intermeshed in our history,
legal and religious imagination” that we cannot “wall off” civil marriage from its
“religious considerations.”209 In a 2003 poll, conducted after Goodridge, “53 percent
of respondents viewed marriage as principally a religious matter, while 33 percent
viewed it principally as a legal matter.”210 Again, Obergefell explicitly describes
marriage as a coming together “to the degree of being sacred.”211 The language of
204 Id. at 115.
205 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593–94.
206 See Koppelman, supra note 77, at 95 (beginning the section entitled “The [Secular
Purpose] Doctrine and Its Difficulties”).
207 See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text (discussing the history of Sunday
Closing Laws).
208 SANFORD N. KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 21 (2003).
209 Perry Dane, A Holy Secular Institution, 58 EMORY L.J. 1123, 1129 (2009); see also
JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND THE LAW
IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (1997); Cohen, supra note 69, at 610 (“With the advent and rise
of Christianity, religious thought began to shape the institution of marriage. . . . Although mar-
riage as sacrament later was abandoned in the Anglo tradition during the English Reformation,
the ‘divine origin of marriage’ nevertheless remained central to legal thought, as evidenced
by the ‘English ecclesiastical courts retain[ing] jurisdiction over marriage and its incidents’
until 1857.” (footnotes omitted)); Charles J. Reid, Jr., Marriage: Its Relationship to Religion,
Law, and the State, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CON-
FLICTS 157, 157 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY] (explaining Reid’s purpose “to demonstrate the ultimate unworkability
of a radical separation of religion and law on the subject of marriage”).
210 Douglas Laycock, Afterword to SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra
note 209, at 189, 205.
211 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965)).
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“transcendent” and “sacred” underscores the religious nature of marriage.212 Again,
civil unions are a “secular alternative to marriage.”213 They provide material bene-
fits, but not the sacred and transcendental imprimatur of marriage.214
As a comparison, consider Metz’s examples of a baptism or bar mitzvah.215 If the
state were to establish or confer such practices (imagine a state sanctioned “coming
of age” ceremony or a legal status that is tied to baptism), they would clearly have
a religious underpinning.216 These ceremonies may have important benefits for those
who undertake them.217 For instance, studies suggest that religious individuals are
less likely than their non-religious counterparts to abuse drugs and alcohol, to be
stressed, and to suffer from low self-esteem than individuals that do not participate
in such practices.218 Even if this may be evidence that individuals ought to consider
becoming religious, it would be problematic for the state to sanction such religious
acts like a “coming of age” ceremony or a baptism. A state sanctioned “coming of
age” ceremony, for instance—like marriage—is based on religious beliefs, broadly
construed. For a state to enact such a ceremony or provide a legal status based on it
stands to violate the Establishment Clause.
It is not just the ethical status of marriage that triggers concern over the separation
of church and state. The very practice of issuing marriage licenses, as Dane points
out, also reveals a significant role for religious authorities: “[Any] casual observer
would, of course, notice that the laws of all the states recognize religious clergy or
religious communities, in addition to various civil officials, as officiants in civil
marriages. No other civil institution is structured quite this way.”219 Or as Martha
Nussbaum puts it:
Clergy are always among those entitled to perform legally bind-
ing marriages. Religions may refuse to marry people who are eli-
gible for state marriage, and they may also agree to marry people
who are ineligible for state marriage. But much of the officially
sanctioned marrying currently done in the United States is done
212 Id. at 2593–94.
213 KATZ, supra note 208, at 21.
214 See Civil Unions & Domestic Partnership Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/civil-unions-and-domestic-partnership-statutes
.aspx [https://perma.cc/U8RK-V8LZ] (last updated Nov. 18, 2014) (providing data on states
that permitted civil unions in 2014 and what benefits those states afford those in civil unions).
215 METZ, supra note 8, at 114–15.
216 See id.
217 See id.
218 See, e.g., Patrick Fagan, Why Religion Matters Even More: The Impact of Religious
Practice on Social Stability, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 18, 2006), http://www.heritage.org
/research/reports/2006/12/why-religion-matters-even-more-the-impact-of-religious-practice
-on-social-stability [http://perma.cc/7QSQ-2QGK].
219 Dane, supra note 209, at 1137 (footnote omitted).
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on religious premises by religious personnel. What they are solem-
nizing (when there is a license granted by the state) is, however,
not only a religious ritual, but also a public rite of passage—the
entry into a privileged civic status.220
This power of a minister to confer the legal status of marriage is not some idiosyn-
cratic feature of marriage law. In every state, some kind of ordained minister or
clergy person has the power to solemnize a marriage.221 Other individuals who may
do so include judges and justices of the peace.222 No other civil institution permits
clergy such a role. A minister may not confer upon an individual a driver’s license,
a permit, or a zoning board approval. By continuing to deploy the label of marriage,
states run the risk of violating the Establishment Clause.
III. STIGMATIZING THE UNMARRIED
Not everyone will marry. Those who refuse to do so decide not to partake in what
Kennedy calls “a great public institution, giving character to our whole civil polity.”223
Marriage in this way provides an ideal. According to a Pew Research Poll in 2012,
seventy five percent of adults over the age of 25 have been married.224 Marriage is
still the norm for the vast majority of adults in the United States.225 Part III argues that
this proliferation of marriage not only stigmatizes the unmarried, but also essen-
tializes gay identity, privileging a married lifestyle over an unmarried one.
A. Marriage as an Intrinsic Good
It is not just that marriage is a status, irreducible to the material benefits that
come with it. Marriage also explicitly privileges a certain intimate way of life as
superior to others. In articulating the importance of marriage in Obergefell, Kennedy
proclaims that “[m]arriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might
call out only to find no one there. It offers the hope of companionship and under-
standing and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the
220 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 129 (2010).
221 US Marriage Laws, AM. MARRIAGE MINISTRIES, https://theamm.org/marriage-laws/
[http://perma.cc/3MBW-KKL9] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
222 Id.
223 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015) (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125
U.S. 190, 213 (1888)).
224 Wendy Wang & Kim Parker, Record Share of Americans Have Never Married, PEW
RES. CTR. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/09/24/record-share-of
-americans-have-never-married/ [http://perma.cc/C2WY-4M43].
225 See id.
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other.”226 In privileging marriage in this way, Kennedy turns out to demean those
who are unmarried—the “lonely person.”227 This is all the more arresting, because
someone may be unmarried but far from alone.228 He or she may have a romantic
partner or partners, a caretaker, friends, family, or a range of other relationships that
he or she may find fulfilling.229
After all, in arguing that bans on gay marriage are unconstitutional, Kennedy
makes clear that marriage is a “keystone of our social order” and a “building block
of our national community.”230 For him, marriage is “a two-person union unlike any
other in its importance to the committed individuals.”231 Brake, in line with Metz,
argues that marriage laws are ultimately based on “[t]he belief that marriage and com-
panionate romantic love have special value.”232 Brake states:
[I]n the assumptions that a central, exclusive, amorous relation-
ship is normal for humans, in that it is a universally shared goal,
and that such a relationship is normative, in that it should be
aimed at in preference to other relationship types. The assumption
that valuable relationships must be marital or amorous devalues
friendships and other caring relationships, as recent manifestos
by urban tribalists, quirkyalones, polyamorists, and asexuals
have insisted.233
If marriage is based on the belief that this kind of companionship is morally superior
to other kinds of personal relationships, a legal status based on this belief plainly
violates liberal neutrality. In fact, David Estlund argues that a “more neutral, more
liberal, liberalism” must reject marriage laws.234
Consider that there are other relationships—being a best friend, a member of a
religious community, or a caretaker for someone you love—that may be just as stable
or significant, or central to human contentment and fulfillment as marriage.235 The
state does not recognize these relationships, relationships that may also have their own
set of public and shared meanings. Why does the state single out marriage but not
these other associations for recognition? What explains the state’s refusal to grant
them any kind of legal status and the myriad benefits that come with that status? For
226 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
227 See id.
228 See BRAKE, supra note 8, at 90–91 (lamenting that some amorous relationships are
privileged over other types of companionship).
229 See id.
230 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
231 Id. at 2589.
232 BRAKE, supra note 8, at 88.
233 Id. at 88–89 (footnote omitted).
234 Estlund, supra note 8, at 164.
235 See BRAKE, supra note 8, at 90–91.
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instance, whereas all fifty states provide a marriage license,236 no state provides a
best friend license. Once we focus on that fact, it becomes clear that the state singles
out marriage because it finds that conception of “the good life” intrinsically superior
to others. This conclusion is problematic from a perspective of liberal neutrality.
The perspective of recent natural law theory is instructive in elucidating the spe-
cial status of marriage.237 Robert George, one of key figures in this tradition, argues
that marriage has “intrinsic, and not merely instrumental value.”238 It is the “one flesh
union” that arises from procreative sex within marriage that constitutes this good:
The central and justifying point of sex is not pleasure, or even
the sharing of pleasure, per se, however much sexual pleasure is
rightly sought as an aspect of the perfection of marital union. The
point of sex, rather, is marriage itself, considered as a bodily
union of persons consummated and actualized by acts which are
reproductive in type.239
Under this view, as I suggest in Beyond Race, Sex, and Sexual Orientation:
[T]he sex act within an opposite-sex marriage is morally supe-
rior to sex acts that occur outside of it. George explicitly privi-
leges this conception of the good, this way of living. He does not
argue that this way of life is superior because it provides benefits
to others. Marriage is an intrinsic good. It is worthwhile for its
own sake, providing a kind of good that other ways of living in-
cluding being unmarried, having “flings” or multiple partners,
or being with platonic friends cannot.240
Given this morally special status of marriage, George’s argument for marriage
explicitly excludes same-sex couples.241 That is his purpose for making it. He would
withhold the state’s conferral of marriage to gays and lesbians.242 Gays and lesbians
236 See Marriage Laws of the Fifty States, District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, LEGAL
INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/table_marriage [https://perma.cc/SG83-5S83]
(last visited Apr. 12, 2018). This source provides a chart demonstrating details of marriage
licenses in the states and territories.
237 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 527–31
(1985) (discussing “natural law” that “predate[s] the creation of the state”); see also
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (recalling the “centrality of marriage to
the human condition” that has existed for millennia).
238 George, supra note 41, at 146.
239 Id. at 145.
240 BEDI, supra note 18, at 227.
241 See generally George, supra note 41, at 146.
242 See id. at 146–47 (asserting that traditional marriage is under assault from people who
have no desire to produce children).
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do not fulfill the procreative part of his definition of marriage.243 But Kennedy
rightly rejects this procreative argument in Obergefell, concluding that states have
not “conditioned the right to marry on the capacity or commitment to procreate.”244
This informs the conclusion above that the objection from procreation is made in
bad faith by same-sex marriage opponents.
Although Obergefell rejects the procreative meaning of marriage, holding that
the fundamental right to marry is not contingent on raising children, it still adopts
the natural law idea that marriage provides an intrinsic good that other ways of liv-
ing do not:
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the
highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.
In forming a marital union, two people become something greater
than once they were. . . . [The hope of those who seek to marry]
is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one
of civilization’s oldest institutions.245
Kennedy places marriage as the “highest” type of relationship,246 thereby devaluing,
in the language of Brake, “friendships and other caring relationships.”247 In fact, for
Kennedy, if one is not married, one is relegated to mere loneliness.248 It is precisely
the superior nature of this kind of legal status that requires the state to permit gay
couples to marry. They, too, must be able to avail themselves of this “profound”
kind of intimate relationship. But in making this argument, Kennedy privileges a cer-
tain way of life as superior, plainly violating liberal neutrality.249 This is natural law,
but with a gay spin.
Now perhaps this conclusion is too quick. Stephen Macedo thoughtfully sug-
gests that marriage promotes public welfare.250 For instance, “[m]arried men (much
evidence suggests) live longer, have lower rates of homicide, suicide, accidents, and
mental illness than unmarried ones.”251 But, as I point out in Beyond Race, Sex, and
Sexual Orientation:
243 See id.
244 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
245 Id. at 2608.
246 See id.
247 BRAKE, supra note 8, at 89.
248 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
249 See id.
250 Stephen Macedo, Sexuality and Liberty: Making Room for Nature and Tradition?, in
SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY, supra note 8, at 86, 94 (“The argument for marriage claims
that more stable commitments promote public as well as private welfare.”). See generally
STEPHEN MACEDO, JUST MARRIED: SAME-SEX COUPLES, MONOGAMY & THE FUTURE OF
MARRIAGE (2015) (assiduously defending same-sex marriage).
251 Macedo, supra note 250, at 94.
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[E]ven if we assume the accuracy of the public welfare claim (and
this itself may be a controversial empirical assumption), it hardly
proves that the state should stay in the marriage business. This
is for two reasons. First, the state could accomplish such public
welfare goals by simply making available a civil union status to
everyone. For instance, if the purpose were to facilitate economic
stability facilitating issues such as inheritance or child support,
civil unions would be sufficient to accomplish this. Why deploy
the label of “marriage”? It is not at all clear that downgrading
marriage in this way would undermine any such benefits, assum-
ing such benefits exist.
Second, it is entirely possible—even likely—that the reason
unmarried individuals may have higher rates of mental illness,
suicide, and the like is because their way of living is not privi-
leged by the state. The state stigmatizes unmarried individuals
by conferring the status of marriage only to those who choose
this as . . . their conception of the good. This is a self-fulfilling
prophecy. By valuing one way of living for its own sake, the state
marks another as socially undesirable. This, in turn, makes it more
likely that those who undertake the “socially undesirable” option
will suffer more than those who do not.252
Moreover, this kind of self-fulfilling public welfare argument could perversely
justify laws and policies that target gays and lesbians.253 It is understandable that
fifty years ago and even today, gays and lesbians had and have higher rates of sui-
cide and mental distress than their straight counterparts.254 Gays were (and of course,
sometimes still are) forced to hide their sexuality by remaining in the “closet.”255 But
we would reject the conclusion that this entails that “being straight” somehow pro-
motes the “public welfare,” even if it is true that gays may have more mental distress
than their straight counterparts.256 It would be absurd, not to mention unjust, to use
252 BEDI, supra note 18, at 230.
253 See id.
254 See id. Potential contributing factors—present both today and fifty years ago—to explain
these higher suicide rates could be the rejection, discrimination, victimization, and violence
associated with being gay. See also infra notes 256, 457 and accompanying text.
255 BEDI, supra note 18, at 230.
256 Id.; see, e.g., Jane Collingwood, Higher Risk of Mental Health Problems for Homo-
sexuals, PSYCH CENTRAL, https://psychcentral.com/lib/higher-risk-of-mental-health-problems
-for-homosexuals/ [http://perma.cc/3DPB-Q4AK] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018) (citing a study
that found twice the rate of suicide attempts among lesbian, gay, and bisexual people); ANN
P. HAAS ET AL., AM. FOUND. FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION & WILLIAMS INST., SUICIDE ATTEMPTS
AMONG TRANSGENDER AND GENDER NON-CONFORMING ADULTS: FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
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this as an argument to uphold anti-gay restrictions. Rather, the conclusion to draw
from these facts about emotional well-being is not that heterosexuality is the answer,
but that the state ought to stop privileging such a lifestyle. By stigmatizing gays and
lesbians with anti-gay laws and policies, the state creates the reality where sexual
minorities are subject to stigma and, in turn, more pronounced mental distress. The
solution is not to continue with such policies but to reject them and stop marginal-
izing those individuals who do not fit the “normal” heterosexual mold. In the same
way, the state ought to stop conferring the morally special status of marriage. Doing
so stands to stigmatize those who are not married, just as those anti-gay laws and
policies that banned gay sex and privileged heterosexuality stigmatize individuals
for being gay.
B. Essentializing Gay Identity
By affirming the importance of monogamous marriage in the context of the con-
stitutional challenge to bans on gay marriage, Obergefell turns out to essentialize gay
identity. Consider that in his dissenting opinion, Roberts raises the objection of plural
marriage (an issue this Article revisits in Part IV).257 “If not having the opportunity to
marry ‘serves to disrespect and subordinate’ gay and lesbian couples, why wouldn’t
the same ‘imposition of this disability’ serve to disrespect and subordinate people who
find fulfillment in polyamorous relationships?”258 Roberts poses the question of what
distinguishes plural or polyamorous relationships from their gay counterparts?259
One difficulty in drawing such a distinction is that prohibitions on same-sex marriage,
as written, do not explicitly discriminate against gays and lesbians as a class.260 After
all, a gay man may marry a lesbian. The law tracks sex, not sexual orientation.261
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2 (2014), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp
-content/uploads/AFSP-Williams-Suicide-Report-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9476-PWBZ]
(“[H]arassment, discrimination, violence and rejection may interact to produce a marked
vulnerability to suicidal behavior in transgender and gender non-conforming individuals.”).
257 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2622 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
258 Id. (internal citation omitted). For a serious defense of a constitutional right to engage
in plural marriage or polyamorous marriage, see Den Otter, supra note 8, at 1983 (“This
Article [contains] some thoughts on why ordinary Americans may begin to discuss plural
marriage with the kind of care that the topic deserves sooner rather than later.”).
259 This slippery slope argument is a powerful one. It means that if the Court bases its
decision on a particular principle, that principle may suggest that other laws and policies are
unconstitutional. See generally Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003) (analyzing how to evaluate the risk of slippery slopes).
260 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 654 (repealed 2010) (establishing Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy
concerning homosexuality in the armed forces); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (hold-
ing that a Colorado amendment discriminating against gays and lesbians was unconstitutional).
For a survey of the different kinds of anti-gay legislation, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999).
261 Certainly, as scholarly work suggests, we could argue that this kind of law is problematic
because it discriminates on the basis of sex or gender. See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE 
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Given that bans on both plural marriage and gay marriage seek to regulate be-
havior or desire262—in one case the desire to marry more than one person and in the
other the desire to marry someone of the same sex—how do we differentiate between
the two? Although Roberts seems to believe that there is no difference (bans on gay
marriage and plural marriage fall or stand together), this Article argues that any pos-
sible difference, if taken seriously, treats the desire of gays and lesbians to marry as
immutable, thereby imposing a heteronormative framework on gay identity.
Andrew Sullivan, for instance, seeks to differentiate the desire to marry a person
of the same sex from the desire to marry more than one person in the following way:
Almost everyone seems to accept, even if they find homosexual-
ity morally troublesome, that it occupies a deeper level of human
consciousness than a polygamous impulse. Even the Catholic
Church, which believes that homosexuality is an “objective dis-
order,” concedes that it is a profound element of human identity.
It speaks of “homosexual persons,” for example, in a way it would
never speak of “polygamous persons.” And almost all of us tac-
itly assume this, even in the very use of the term “homosexuals.”
We accept also that multiple partners can be desired by gays and
straights alike: that polygamy is an activity, whereas both homo-
sexuality and heterosexuality are states.263
GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 60 (2002) (“Sexual-orientation
discrimination is distinct from sex discrimination; they aren’t the same thing.” (emphasis
removed)); Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 103 (2005) (“This Article sketches
out the sex- and gender-based arguments that have emerged in the scholarly literature and
judicial opinions about same-sex marriage . . . .”); Sandi Farrell, Reconsidering the Gender-
Equality Perspective for Understanding LGBT Rights, 13 LAW & SEXUALITY 605, 609
(2004) (discussing specific legal prohibitions against discrimination based on sex); Andrew
Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 955 (1984) (dealing only with sex discrimination and not sexual orientation); Deborah
A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent
Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 461, 462 (2007) (pointing out
the rarity of successfully argued sexual orientation cases that allege sex discrimination). In that
way, whereas a ban on plural marriage discriminates on the basis of numbers, a ban on gay
marriage discriminates on the basis of sex or gender. But see Edward Stein, Evaluating the
Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471, 500 (2001).
262 Andrew Sullivan, Three’s a Crowd, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON: A READER
278, 279 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997) [hereinafter SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON]
(contemplating potential differences in gay, lesbian, polygamous, and traditional hetero-
sexual marriages).
263 Id.
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Even if a prohibition on same-sex marriage does not explicitly discriminate on the
basis of sex or gender, it regulates desire that is, according to Sullivan, central to how
gays and lesbians identify themselves.264 Bans on plural marriage, in contrast, regu-
late behavior that is not central to who someone is. As Jonathan Rauch posits: “Do
homosexuals actually exist? I think so . . . . By contrast, no serious person claims
there are people constitutively attracted only to relatives, or only to groups rather
than individuals.”265 Whereas the desire for someone of the same sex marks out an
actual identity—it is central to what it means to be gay or lesbian—the desire for more
than one person or one’s sibling does not.266
This means that prohibitions on same-sex marriage strike at who gays and lesbians
are, not simply what they may want to do. Although the Court may not do enough to
respond to Roberts’s rejoinder of plural marriage, Kennedy does say: “Far from seeking
to devalue marriage, the petitioners seek it for themselves because of their respect—and
need—for its privileges and responsibilities. And their immutable nature dictates
that same-sex marriage is their only real path to this profound commitment.”267
Whereas the desire to be in a plural marriage is not immutable, the desire to be
in a same-sex marriage is.268 Kennedy realizes that “psychiatrists and others recog-
nized that sexual orientation is both a normal expression of human sexuality and
immutable.”269 Those who seek to marry more than one person may be straight or
gay. Sexual orientation is more basic than the desire to be in a plural marriage.270
Kennedy further says: “The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond,
two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and
spirituality. This is true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation.”271
This language of immutability points to an important claim by proponents of gay
marriage that being gay is often central to one’s sexual identity.272 As David Richards
argues, claims by gays and lesbians “are in their nature claims to a self-respecting
personal and moral identity in public and private life through which they may reason-
ably express and realize their ethical convictions of the moral powers of friendship
264 Id. (highlighting that even the Catholic Church concedes that homosexuality “is a pro-
found element of human identity”). 
265 Jonathan Rauch, Marrying Somebody, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, supra
note 262, at 285, 286.
266 See id. at 287–88 (criticizing concerns that permitting same-sex marriage will open the
door to polygamy because the two are fundamentally different).
267 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
268 See id. at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
269 Id. at 2596 (majority opinion).
270 See id. (stating that sexual orientation is a “normal expression of human sexuality”).
271 Id. at 2599.
272 See RICHARDS, supra note 75, at 92–93; Emily R. Gill, Beyond Immutability: Sexuality
and Constitutive Choice, 76 REV. POL. 93, 102 (2014) (“Sexual/emotional desires, feelings,
aspirations, and behavior . . . are of central importance for human beings . . . .” (citation
omitted)).
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and love in a good, fulfilled, and responsible life.”273 This is why gay and lesbian
organizations often deploy the locution of “sexual orientation” rather than “sexual
preference.”274 Constitutive of gay and lesbian identity is the desire for those of the
same sex.275 Bans on gay marriage therefore discriminate against a bona fide identity
group or class. Limitations on numerosity do not strike at who plural marriage enthu-
siasts are. These limitations only regulate behavior. This may suggest that although
bans on gay marriage are wrong, bans on plural marriage are not.
This emphasis on immutability suggests that gays and lesbians, unlike plural mar-
riage enthusiasts, ought to be a suspect class for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause.276 Although the Court has not gone this far,277 scholarly work has argued that
gays and lesbians ought to count as one.278 This would mean that whereas laws
273 RICHARDS, supra note 75, at 93.
274 See e.g., Employment: Demanding Workplace Equality, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www
.lambdalegal.org/issues/employment-and-rights-in-the-workplace/ [http://perma.cc/D5P5
-Q3W7] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018); see also Legal Discrimination, OUTRIGHT ACTION
INT’L, https://www.outrightinternational.org/theme/legal-discrimination [http://perma.cc/BX9H
-DUSY] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018); Know Your Rights, GLAD, http://www.glad.org/know
-your-rights/ [http://perma.cc/5XGV-HBZE] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
275 See Rauch, supra note 265, at 286.
276 The Supreme Court’s equal protection doctrine triggers heightened scrutiny when a law
invokes a suspect classification. Under current case law, laws discriminating on the basis of
race (e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)), alienage (e.g., Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 371–76 (1971)), or national origin (e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633,
646–47 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)), get strict scrutiny;
that is, where the Court asks if the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state pur-
pose (e.g., Graham, 403 U.S. at 375–76). Laws discriminating against sex get intermediate
scrutiny; that is, where the Court asks if the law is substantially related to an important gov-
ernmental purpose (e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
277 Some federal courts of appeals have held that sexual orientation is a suspect classifica-
tion, focusing in particular on immutability. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1347–
49 (9th Cir. 1988) (“We have no trouble concluding that sexual orientation is immutable for
the purposes of equal protection doctrine.”), vacated and aff’d on other grounds, 875 F.2d
699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); see also Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying
heightened scrutiny); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 657 (7th Cir. 2014) (“And there is little
doubt that sexual orientation, the ground of the discrimination, is an immutable (and probably
an innate, in the sense of in-born) characteristic . . . .”); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d
169, 183–84, 183 n.4 (2d Cir. 2012) (subjecting sexual-orientation discrimination to
heightened scrutiny in part because it is sufficiently immutable), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013) (invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act without holding that sexual orientation is
a suspect classification).
278 For authors who answer in the affirmative, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 162–64 (1980); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 742 (1985); Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orien-
tation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 264 (1996);
Sunstein, supra note 125, at 1168; Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument
for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1756 (1996); Note, The
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discriminating against gays and lesbians ought to receive higher scrutiny, laws dis-
criminating against plural marriage enthusiasts would not.279 Whereas this would
doom bans on gay marriage, it would make it easier for the state to justify their plural
marriage counterparts.
But this argument comes at a cost of violating liberal neutrality; it privileges cer-
tain kinds of gay lives, those that value monogamy, for instance, over others. Sullivan
and Rauch, as well as Kennedy, imply that the desire to marry someone of the same sex
is crucial to being gay, just as marrying someone of the opposite sex may be crucial
to being straight—“[t]his is true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation.”280
In order for the conventional argument for gay marriage to succeed, it is insufficient
simply to assume that desiring someone of the same sex is central to gay identity. That
assumption would not pose a fundamental objection to bans on same-sex marriage.
After all, if individuals have the option to have sex with and live with individuals of
the same sex, even setting up domestic partnerships or civil unions to that effect, a
ban on same-sex marriage would not interfere with the core of gay desire.
Roberts explains in his dissent that, even with a ban on gay marriage, “[s]ame-
sex couples remain free to live together, to engage in intimate conduct, and to raise
their families as they see fit.”281 In contrast, according to Roberts, sodomy laws (like
the one the Court invalidated in Lawrence), involve “government intrusions,” even
going so far as making gay sex a “crime.”282 These latter laws do interfere with who
gays and lesbians are and prevent them from acting on their desire or love for someone
of the same sex, whereas prohibitions on same-sex marriage do not.283 Put differ-
ently, Roberts suggests that such a prohibition does not thwart a gay person’s ability
to love someone of the same sex. It merely thwarts their desire to marry the person
they desire or love. In order for such a prohibition to discriminate against an identity
group rather than behavior, as in the case of plural marriage, this desire must be
central to what it means to be gay or lesbian. Only then do limitations on same-sex
marriage become different from bans on plural marriage by discriminating against
gays and lesbians rather than simply prohibiting mere desire or behavior.
Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (1985). For an argument that the presumption against sex discrim-
ination is sufficient to invalidate sexual-orientation discrimination, see Koppelman, supra
note 262, at 220. But see Stein, supra note 261, at 474 (arguing against a sex-discrimination
approach to sexual-orientation discrimination).
279 This Article largely avoids applying the strict versus rational review standards, focusing
instead on the justificatory implications for treating laws banning gay marriage differently
from laws banning their plural counterparts.
280 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015); see supra notes 263–66 and
accompanying text.
281 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
282 Id.
283 See id.
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This is the problem: there are many gays and lesbians, including this author (as
well as many heterosexuals, to be sure), who do not desire to marry—who may even
despise the idea, let alone view the desire to marry as central to who they are. They
may prefer nonmonogamous, anonymous, or multi-partner sex—or choose to remain
unmarried. To suggest that the desire to marry is fundamental to what it means to
be gay essentializes the notion of gay identity.284 It binds individuals to what Kwame
Anthony Appiah calls identity “scripts,” scripts that outline what it means to be a
member of a particular group; in this case, what it means to be gay.285
In particular, this kind of argument turns out to affirm a surprisingly traditional,
heteronormative depiction of human desire—one that privileges monogamy and
commitment over being unmarried and sexually active with multiple partners. Those
who choose to be unmarried are, under the terms of this argument, defective and
“condemned to live in loneliness,” as Kennedy opines.286 They are failing to live up
to their essential nature as human beings (whether gay or straight) to marry someone
they love. Making the desire to marry fundamental, as Kennedy does, straightfor-
wardly downgrades those—gay or straight—who choose to remain unmarried. It treats
them as less than, as inferior to their marriage-seeking counterparts. This strategy
to distinguish same-sex marriage from its plural counterpart violates liberal neutral-
ity by blatantly treating the unmarried life as inferior to a two-person, married,
monogamous union.
This irony within the gay marriage movement has not gone unnoticed. Self-
described “queer theory” criticizes mainstream gay and lesbian identity for reaffirming
traditional heteronormative values.287 Darren Rosenblum argues that many self-pro-
claimed “queers” explore and celebrate other kinds of sexuality: “public sex (parks,
tearooms, ‘adult bookstores,’ backrooms), anonymous sex, group sex, promiscuity,
sado-masochism, and role-playing.”288 Treating the desire to marry as central to who
gays and lesbians are essentializes gay identity and marginalizes these non-hetero-
normative desires and behaviors.289 Ultimately, this argument (once again) privileges
284 Cf. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 22–23 (2005) (explaining
how collective identity formation affects self-narratives).
285 See id.
286 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
287 See generally ANNAMARIE JAGOSE, QUEER THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (1996);
MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER
LIFE viii (1999) (pointing to “a number of ways that the politics of sexual shame makes the
ideal impossible for variant sexualities”); Andrew Sullivan, The Conservative Case for Gay
Marriage, TIME (June 22, 2003) http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,460232
,00.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20171017160827/http://content.time.com/time/maga
zine/article/0,9171,460232,00.html] (worrying that the expansion of the right to marry “will
surely change the gay subculture in subtle but profoundly conservative ways”).
288 Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and the Failure of Recent Lesbian and Gay
“Victories,” 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 83, 108 (1994).
289 See id. at 85.
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a conception of the good that values marriage over one that does not. It reinforces
the idea that a life with a committed romantic partner is superior to a life without one.
IV. PROMOTING MONOGAMY
According to Obergefell, marriage represents the “highest ideals of love, fidelity,
devotion, sacrifice, and family.”290 In rejecting procreation and the raising of children,
Obergefell adopts a “companionate” model of marriage that makes monogamy cen-
tral to this civil institution.291 Part IV argues that the emphasis on monogamy raises
perhaps the most illiberal feature of marriage, one that both refuses to recognize
other kinds of adult living arrangements and stands to infringe our sexual liberty.292
A. Companionate Model
Marriage may include the raising of children, but this is not a necessary feature of
the institution, as shown above.293 Marriage is about companionship. Richard Posner
defines marriage as a union
between at least approximate equals, based on mutual respect and
affection, and involving close and continuous association in child
rearing, household management, and other activities, rather than
merely the occasional copulation [of the procreative model].294
Or as Evan Wolfson puts it: “[M]arriage is first and foremost about a loving union be-
tween two people who enter into a relationship of emotional and financial commitment
290 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
291 See id.
292 It is worth pointing out that state-sanctioned monogamy is not limited just to marriage.
See Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous
Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 284 (2004) (“Norms strongly urge people
toward monogamy, and law contributes to that pressure in the various ways listed above,
namely criminal adultery laws, bigamy laws, marriage laws, custody cases, workplace dis-
crimination, and zoning laws. To the extent that at least some people may be happier in non-
monogamous arrangements, and others are not harmed by these arrangements, it would seem
that laws should be changed to allow people to find their own path among monogamy and
its alternatives.”); see also Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family,
119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1259 (2010) (analyzing criminal sanctions invoked by the state to regu-
late families: “Against this model, families that resist, rebel, or simply fail to conform may be
perceived as threats to the political order. Historically, the state has responded to such threats
in many ways. Of particular interest here are responses that involve criminal sanctions.”).
293 See supra notes 97–113, 237–44 and accompanying text.
294 RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 45 (1992); see also Ruth K. Khalsa, Note,
Polygamy as a Red Herring in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 54 DUKE L.J. 1665, 1669–70
(2005) (commenting on Posner’s “economic theory of sexuality”).
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and interdependence.”295 Marriage is the status that demonstrates to others their com-
mitment to this kind of union. Marriage is about spending one’s life with another indi-
vidual in a reciprocal relationship. Goodridge also adopts the companionate model
of marriage: “While it is certainly true that many, perhaps most, married couples
have children together (assisted or unassisted), it is the exclusive and permanent
commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting of children,
that is the sine qua non of civil marriage.”296 This model of marriage is, as William
Eskridge suggests, “most similar to those that are typically valorized by most mod-
ern Western perspectives.”297
Informing this companionate model, Reynolds v. United States298 and Obergefell
serve as bookend cases that affirm the definition of marriage as a monogamous union
of two committed individuals.299 Reynolds entailed a challenge to a federal law that
criminalized the practice of polygamy.300 Not only did the Court uphold such a law,
it connected the two-person nature of marriage to monogamy.301 Reynolds held:
“[T]here cannot be a doubt that, unless restricted by some form of constitution, it is
within the legitimate scope of the power of every civil government to determine
whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social life under its dominion.”302
The state could decide to recognize polygamy, in this case the marriage of one man
to more than one woman. Yet, the Court reasons that the government may conclude
that, whereas “polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle,” that principle “cannot
long exist in connection with monogamy.”303 This means that marriage, as under-
stood in the United States, is a companionate model entailing a monogamous (two-
person) union.
Although at the time of Reynolds, marriage was understood as a monogamous
union between a man and a woman, Obergefell defines its nature as a union of two
committed individuals, irrespective of sex:
The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two
persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, in-
timacy, and spirituality. This is true for all persons, whatever their
295 Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay
Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 567, 579 (1994).
296 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).
297 William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1436
(1993).
298 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878) (upholding a criminal prohibition on polygamy).
299 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (providing a brief history of
marriage rights case law).
300 See 98 U.S. at 161–67 (contemplating “the defence of religious belief or duty”).
301 Id. at 165–66 (“So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive
dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed.”).
302 Id. at 166.
303 Id.
2018] AN ILLIBERAL UNION 1129
sexual orientation. There is dignity in the bond between two men
or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make
such profound choices.304
In fact, Obergefell approvingly cites the description of marriage in Griswold v.
Connecticut305:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony
in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial
or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose
as any involved in our prior decisions.306
We must acknowledge that this commitment is a commitment to lifetime monog-
amy. This means that married individuals will be intimate only with each other until
one partner dies (or they procure a divorce).307 The status of marriage is not a five-,
ten-, or even twenty-year commitment that automatically dissolves after the specified
number of years. The commitment to share a life together, including the possibility
of intimacy, is one that is importantly indefinite (“till death do us part”).308 Such is
the nature of marriage.
This is why Obergefell contends that “the right to marry is fundamental because
it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed
individuals.”309 This language of “commitment,” “harmony,” and “loyalty” speaks
to the importance of monogamy.
B. Excluding Alternatives: Plural and Caregiving Unions
This Article considers two possible alternatives to monogamous marriage: plu-
ral marriage and an adult caregiving union.310 No state currently recognizes these
304 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (internal citation omitted).
305 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (affirming a substantive due process
right to privacy for married couples to use contraception).
306 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599–600 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486).
307 See id. at 2589 (discussing the intimacy of marital association to the two committed
individuals).
308 See Elizabeth F. Emens, Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and Countermarriage, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 235, 241 (2011).
309 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589.
310 For other marriage alternatives that draw from literature, see Emens, supra note 308,
at 239 (discussing “countermarriage” or “the vast range of alternative ways we might regu-
late intimate relationships”).
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arrangements.311 Those who opt to do so are simply treated as unmarried,312 living
in the shadow of those who the state will marry. At the outset, as in the case of same-
sex marriage, we cannot look to concerns of tradition or preserving the current two
person marriages to exclude these kinds of arrangements from state recognition.313
Again, emphasis on tradition as argued above turns out to be either circular or prof-
fered in bad faith.314 For instance, simply suggesting that marriage has always been
about two, non-blood-related individuals instead of three or four individuals or one
sibling taking care of his brother is circular. Just because that specification has been
the positive law’s definition of marriage in the past does not mean it ought to remain
that way. Simply suggesting that the state has always done something a particular
way is not a constitutionally sufficient reason, on its own, to maintain the practice.315
That very argument failed in justifying bans on gay marriage.316 So, to deploy it now
is to engage in what Den Otter, a defender of plural marriage, calls a blatant consti-
tutional “double standard.”317 It is worth noting that Roberts cites Den Otter’s article
in his Obergefell dissent to proclaim as much.318 Challenging the nature of marriage
as only a monogamous union, this Article takes seriously the possible alternatives
to such a union.
311 See Metz, supra note 8, at 208–10 (suggesting that traditional marriage should be aban-
doned in favor of intimate caregiving union status (ICGU)).
312 See id. (arguing that conferral of special rights to married couples does not promote
fairness or equality).
313 Emens, supra note 308, at 257 (recalling extreme laws that invalidated contracts be-
tween same-sex partners in addition to preventing same-sex marriage).
314 See supra notes 100–36 and accompanying text.
315 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (overruling state bans on
gay marriage).
316 Id. at 2589 (noting that “new insight” can inspire re-evaluation of history and tradition
in constitutional interpretation).
317 Den Otter, supra note 8, at 1981 (“As the debate over the meaning of marriage con-
tinues, those who oppose plural marriage can be expected to draw upon some of the argu-
ments that traditionalists have deployed against marriage between people of the same gender.
In articulating their normative constitutional view, they will have to do more than consult a
dictionary, refer to religious understandings, conduct survey research, embrace ‘tradition,’
investigate how most people happen to use the ‘m’ word, put forth empirically unfounded
claims, or generalize from outliers. In the face of this double standard, progressives could
(1) change their minds and reject a constitutional right to same-sex marriage (or its equivalent
on equal protection grounds) or (2) attempt to defend the constitutionality of unequal legal
treatment of polygamists and polyamorists who would marry if they could.”); see also
Greggary E. Lines, Note, Polymmigration: Immigration Implications and Possibilities Post
Brown v. Buhman, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 477, 500 (2016) (“Th[e] broader recognition of rights
for same-sex couples indicates a favorable view toward protecting once-forbidden relation-
ships among minority groups. There are notable—although not exact—similarities between
the LGBTQ and polygamy movements, including the desire to protect extramarital relation-
ships and the expanding view of the family.” (footnotes omitted)).
318 135 S. Ct. at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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This Article defines “plural marriage” as a marriage among three or more adults,
often referred to as “polygamy.”319 It includes polygynous marriage (one man and
two or more women),320 polyandrous ones (one woman and two or more men)321 or
marriages composed of more than two individuals of the same sex.322 One man and
many women may be the more popular instance of plural marriage, but certainly not
the only kind.323 This is why this Article adopts the neutral language of “plural
marriage.” Den Otter makes the most sustained argument that bans on plural mar-
riage are, in fact, unconstitutional, violating a substantive due process right324 to
autonomy and the Equal Protection Clause.325 Elizabeth F. Emens critiques the nu-
merosity requirement, arguing that scholars have not done enough in challenging the
underlying value of monogamy and the prevalence of polyamory.326 Without engaging
the full range of normative and constitutional issues that arise with plural marriage,
this Article focuses on concerns of gender inequality and harm to women that often
underlie the objection to plural marriage. This Article argues that such concerns fail
to justify a categorical ban on such marriages for two reasons.
First, problems of gender and inequality and harm to women have historically
been associated with heterosexual marriage.327 As Obergefell explains in outlining
the development of marriage law: “[U]nder the centuries-old doctrine of coverture,
a married man and woman were treated by the State as a single, male-dominated
319 Polygamy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/polyg
amy [https://perma.cc/7BFH-MMF2] (last updated Apr. 15, 2018).
320 Polygyny, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/polyg
yny [https://perma.cc/P4PJ-263K] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
321 Polyandry, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/poly
andry [https://perma.cc/9S5D-L76U] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
322 Plural Marriage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/plural%20marriage [https://perma.cc/M24X-DZ5Y] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
323 See supra notes 319–22 and accompanying text.
324 On Substantive Due Process:
From the standpoint of substantive due process, the significance of being
able to select multiple marital partners cannot be overestimated. . . . [A]
competent adult should be able to marry however many people she
wants for just about whatever personal reasons she happens to have,
unless a marriage is so large and complex that it becomes administra-
tively unmanageable.
Den Otter, supra note 8, at 2001.
325 “[The] equal protection analysis leads to the conclusion that laws that fail to allow
plural marriage enthusiasts to have the kind of intimate relationship that they want violate
the Constitution.” Id. at 2015.
326 Emens, supra note 8, at 284 (describing what she calls the “paradox of prevalence”).
327 See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of
the Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Feder-
alism, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 110 (2000) (highlighting the fact that Congress passed the
Violence Against Women Act specifically to redress inequality of violence against women).
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legal entity.”328 Until recently, the common law of many states saw husband and wife
as one person.329 Spouses “could not be on opposite sides of any lawsuit for either
personal injury or property damage.”330 Consequently, a husband could physically
abuse his wife with no threat of legal sanction.331 It is precisely during this era of
coverture when the Court upholds a prohibition of bigamy in Reynolds, citing con-
cerns of patriarchy.332 It is telling that women could not vote at that time.333
So two-person couplings have historically posed concerns of exit and domina-
tion for women. This does not, however, justify prohibiting heterosexual marriage!
After all, as Andrew March argues, if the concern is genuinely about inequality or
a woman’s ability to exit, the state can regulate “multiple-member” unions just as
the state regulates two person ones, “with special concern for the autonomy, prop-
erty rights, and freedom of exit for vulnerable women.”334 And as Obergefell makes
clear, “[a]s women gained legal, political, and property rights, and as society began
to understand that women have their own equal dignity, the law of coverture was
328 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 430 (1765)).
329 Id. (“Under the centuries-old doctrine of coverture, a married man and woman were
treated by the State as a single, male-dominated legal entity.”).
330 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1332 (7th ed. 2000). For
arguments challenging marriage on feminist grounds, see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN,
THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY xiii (2004) (arguing, in part, that the
desirability “of autonomy for individuals and families has seriously limited the ways in which
we think about equality”); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 1 (1995) [hereinafter FINEMAN,
NEUTERED MOTHER] (examining “the cultural and legal processes in which the sexual-intimate
connection has been designated as dominant in the construction of the family”); Claudia
Card, Against Marriage and Motherhood, 11 HYPATIA 1, 1 (1996) (criticizing “marriage and
motherhood as they are currently practiced and structured by Northern legal institutions”);
Clare Chambers, The Marriage-Free State, 113 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 123, 123
(2013) (arguing that “feminist critiques can best be reconciled and answered by the abolition
of state-recognized marriage”); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Meaning of Marriage, in
MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS 29 (Anita Bernstein ed., 2006)
[hereinafter Fineman, Meaning of Marriage].
331 See EPSTEIN, supra note 330, at 1332.
332 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165–66 (1878).
333 19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Women’s Right to Vote (1920), OUR
DOCUMENTS, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=63 [http://perma.cc
/F5FB-HEZX] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018) (noting that the Nineteenth Amendment was not
passed until 1920).
334 March, supra note 8, at 260. In Martha Nussbaum’s words: “[T]o rule that [opposite-
sex] marriage as such should be illegal on the grounds that it reinforces male dominance would
be an excessive intrusion upon liberty, even if one should believe marriage irredeemably
unequal.” MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 295 (1999); see also Cheshire
Calhoun, Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage? Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage Advocacy
from the History of Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1023, 1038 (2005) (discussing in-
stances in which plural marriage was meant to empower or protect women).
2018] AN ILLIBERAL UNION 1133
abandoned.”335 Just as extant problems of harm and gender inequality in heterosex-
ual marriage336 do not rule it out as a legitimate union recognized by the state, so too
with plural marriage. According to Den Otter, “[a]n individual cannot simply play
the gender-equality card as if the mere fact that some plural marriages would be
inegalitarian warrants denying legal recognition to all of its conceivable forms.”337
Second, even on its merits, this kind of objection to plural marriage may be
proffered in bad faith.338 For instance, a marriage of three gay men would not raise
concerns of gender inequality and harm to women. Often, the specter of plural mar-
riage involves a polygynous union, between one man and more than one woman. A
state could simply prohibit such unions given the above-mentioned concerns. Until
Obergefell, states routinely limited marriage on the basis of sex or gender.339 Although
they may no longer do so with two person unions (this stands to demean gays and
lesbians), they could certainly do so with multiple-member unions.340 Under this sit-
uation, whereas one man and two women could not marry (given the possible con-
cern of gender inequality and harm), three men could. And a state could permit such
a marriage and simultaneously prohibit such a union from adopting or raising children,
if there is a concern about numerosity and parenting. After all, as demonstrated above,
the issue of raising children is distinct from the issue of marriage.
Yet, every state currently prohibits marriages among three individuals, even
those of the same sex.341 This prohibition is telling. It reveals that at least some
335 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015).
336 See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 327, at 138; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing
Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135 (2000); Louis J.
Virelli III & David S. Leibowitz, “Federalism Whether They Want It or Not”: The New
Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future of Federal Civil Rights Legislation After United
States v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926 (2001).
337 Den Otter, supra note 8, at 1990.
Unless one dogmatically subscribes to the view that all monogamous
marriages are better along all dimensions than all multi-person intimate
relationships, little imagination is required to appreciate how a plural
marriage could be happier, healthier, and more conducive to human
flourishing. Not only is that view demonstrably false, it fails to account
for the fact that different people have different ideas about intimacy
and what is most important to them more generally.
Id. at 1986.
338 March, supra note 8, at 262–68. This section of March’s article discusses “Fairness in
the Market for Partners.”
339 135 S. Ct. at 2596–97.
340 See, e.g., Yanan Wang, Utah’s Polygamy Ban Restored in Big Defeat for ‘Sister Wives,’
WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016
/04/12/utahs-polygamy-ban-restored-as-sister-wives-lawsuit-declared-moot/ [http://perma.cc
/99C2-NFAV] (discussing a ruling which “prohibit[s] married people from living with ad-
ditional partners”).
341 Sharon Bernstein, Appeals Court Restores Utah’s Polygamy Law in ‘Sister Wives’ Case,
HUFFPOST (Apr. 11, 2016, 3:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sister-wives
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limitations on plural marriage cannot be justified on grounds of gender equality or
preventing harm to women. This means that a categorical ban on plural marriage
simply rests on the idea that a monogamous union is morally superior to a three-or-
more person one violating liberal neutrality. That argument did not suffice in justifying
bans on gay marriage, so it should not justify their plural marriage counterparts. If
anything, it is precisely the claim about moral superiority that stigmatizes those who
may be living in a multiple person union, just as bans on gay marriage stigmatized
those same-sex couples living without access to marriage.
In addition to categorical bans on plural marriage, no state recognizes adult unions
devoted to caregiving.342 These kinds of unions are not about sexual monogamy, rather
they are about domestic and economic cooperation or caring for the physical and emo-
tional needs of a loved one.343 Drawing from a framework of liberal neutrality, Metz
rejects monogamous marriage, arguing that we should remove its sexual or intimate as-
pect entirely.344 In its place, she argues for an “intimate caregiving union” (ICGU).345
She justifies this kind of union to promote, protect, and regulate intimate caregiving:
Justice and prudence recommend that the state recognize and
regulate unions within which intimate care is given and received:
families, functional families, and networks of intimate care. Con-
temporary scholars describe myriad relationships that fall into
this category. These include parents and children (biological and
de facto); husband and wife; long-term, cohabitating hetero- and
homosexual lovers and partners; “lesbigay” units; nonsexually
intimate adult units or groups; adult siblings; adult children; and
aging parents.346
This kind of ICGU would be open to “sexually intimate unions” and “nonsexually
intimate” ones.347 An ailing grandmother could form an ICGU with her granddaughter,
for instance, providing a legal status that would support her caregiving.
Consider a platonic, caregiving union between adult siblings of the same sex.
No state would permit such individuals to marry.348 Generally, prohibitions on adult
-case-utah_US_570bF74ae4b0885fb50dc415 [http://perma.cc/B59R-Y5XC] (“Polygamy is
illegal in all 50 states.”).
342 See Legal Issues for LGBT Caregivers, FAM. CAREGIVER ALLIANCE, https://www.care
giver.org/legal-issues-lgbt-caregivers [http://perma.cc/R4NV-Y5DV] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018)
(discussing the value of caregiver relationships and the legal implications associated therewith).
343 See Metz, supra note 8, at 197, 210 (stating that ICGUs achieve “[l]egitimate public
welfare goals traditionally treated through marriage”).
344 METZ, supra note 8, at 114 (contending that “[t]he existing relationship between mar-
riage and the state threatens liberty and equality”).
345 Id.
346 Id. at 120–21 (footnotes omitted).
347 Id. at 135.
348 Incest Laws in the United States, UCSB, http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/sexinfo/article/incest
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incestuous relationships hinge on, borrowing Andrew March’s language, “the crea-
tion of bad lives,”349 namely children with severe birth defects. It is worth noting that
March argues that this concern may be too weak to justify such a limitation.350 But
even more telling is that this kind of reason cannot be offered in good faith. It would
only prohibit two blood-related opposite-sex siblings from marrying.351 Two adult
brothers (or two sisters) who seek to marry in order to take care of each other or to
avail themselves of the other material benefits of marriage do not trigger any possible
concerns of procreation or the “creation of bad lives.” Yet, no state currently recog-
nizes this kind of platonic relationship. Marriage law refuses to recognize such alter-
native unions that may be important to a range of families and personal relationships.
This means every state’s categorical ban on consanguinity, one that includes the
case of two sisters or two brothers, must be based on the idea that a sexually monog-
amous union of non-blood-related individuals is simply morally superior to a platonic
union of two blood-related ones.352 This categorical prohibition on non-sexually inti-
mate unions suggests that such unions are inferior, just as the categorical ban on gay
marriage suggested that those unions were inferior. Even with Obergefell, marriage
law refuses to recognize alternative unions that may be important to a range of fam-
ilies and personal relationships.
C. The Problem of the Crime of Adultery
The state may decide to protect this monogamous union not just by restricting
who may marry. It may even infringe our sexual liberty by criminalizing adultery, de-
fined as a married individual having sex with someone other than his or her spouse.353
The Commonwealth of Virginia prosecuted John R. Bushey, Jr., a former town attor-
ney, for adultery in 2004.354 Bushey, who was married for eighteen years, had con-
sensual sex with a woman who was not his wife.355 He violated a Virginia criminal
law that defined adultery as voluntarily having “sexual intercourse with any person
-laws-united-states [https://perma.cc/M397-HGZY] (last updated Mar. 10, 2016) (“In all states,
incestuous marriages are illegal.” (footnote omitted)).
349 Andrew F. March, What Lies Beyond Same-Sex Marriage? Marriage, Reproductive
Freedom and Future Persons in Liberal Public Justification, 27 J. APPLIED PHIL. 39, 49 (2010).
350 Id. at 49–54. This section of March’s article deals extensively with the “Creation of
Bad Lives” idea.
351 Id. at 53 (discussing punishments designed to deter siblings from marrying).
352 See generally Will Baude, When Is Ignorance of Consanguinity Bliss?, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Aug. 20, 2013, 4:43 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/08/20/when-is-ignorance-of
-consanguinity-bliss/ [http://perma.cc/U6D3-JKAT] (discussing a situation where a man un-
wittingly married his cousin).
353 Adultery, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/adultery
[http://perma.cc/9JVC-A6YA] (last updated Apr. 4, 2018).
354 Jonathan Turley, Of Lust and the Law, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2004, at B1.
355 Id.
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not his or her spouse.”356 The statute classifies adultery as a Class 4 misdemeanor.357
Bushey ultimately plead guilty, accepting twenty hours of community service.358
Twenty states in the United States currently criminalize adultery,359 sometimes
with a possible punishment that can include jail time.360 Although these laws are rarely
enforced,361 states may decide to bring prosecutions based on them, as did Virginia.
The mere existence of these laws means that the threat of enforcement is always
possible. In fact, in a 2015 Gallup Poll, 92 percent of Americans consider adultery
morally unacceptable.362 It is worth noting that adultery prosecutions are more com-
mon in the military.363 This invites us to evaluate the reach of a putative liberal state
in our personal affairs in light of marriage. Consider that until 2003 when the Court
356 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (2018) (defining the crime and penalty for committing
adultery).
357 Id.
358 Turley, supra note 354.
359 See ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 (2017); FLA.
STAT. § 798.01 (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (2017); IDAHO CODE § 18-6601 (2018);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-35 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-501 (West 2018);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 14 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.30 (2018); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.36 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney
2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-09 (2017); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § 871 (2018); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60
(2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (2018); WIS.
STAT. § 944.16 (2018).
360 See Gabrielle Viator, Note, The Validity of Criminal Adultery Prohibitions After Law-
rence v. Texas, 39 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 837, 840 (2006) (exploring the impact of Lawrence
and discussing the continuing viability of adultery statutes); see also DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER
M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHAL-
LENGE OF FAMILY TIES 71 (2009) (stating that most states do not actively prosecute adultery
even though twenty-three states (at the time of this books’ publication) have laws that crim-
inalize the conduct).
361 Ethan Bronner, Mass. Among 23 States Where Adultery Is a Crime, but Rarely
Prosecuted, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2012
/11/15/adultery-still-crime-states-including-mass/KiIPGRcFnAeT4CGmenFTKM/story.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171002062925/https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation
/2012/11/15/adultery-still-crime-states-including-mass/KiIPGRcFnAeT4CGmenFTKM
/story.html].
362 See Andrew Dugan, Once Taboo, Some Behaviors Now More Acceptable in U.S.,
GALLUP (June 1, 2015), http://news.gallup.com/poll/183455/once-taboo-behaviors-accept
able.aspx [https://web.archive.org/web/20180122082644/http://news.gallup.com/poll/183455
/once-taboo-behaviors-acceptable.aspx].
363 See Melissa Ash Haggard, Adultery: A Comparison of Military Law and State Law and
the Controversy This Causes Under Our Constitution and Criminal Justice System, 37
BRANDEIS L.J. 469, 470, 476–77 (1998) (emphasizing nonetheless the difficulty of prose-
cuting adultery in the Armed Forces); see also James M. Winner, Beds with Sheets but No
Covers: The Right to Privacy and the Military’s Regulation of Adultery, 31 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1073 (1998) (assessing the constitutionality of the military’s adultery law).
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struck down sodomy laws, 13 states prohibited that sexual practice.364 Even though
these laws were also often not enforced, we would consider their very presence as in-
fringements on our sexual liberty. The mere existence of sodomy laws was significant.
Such laws revealed principled limits on the power of a liberal state in regulating our
intimate lives.365
The case of laws criminalizing adultery invites us to do the same, bringing into
sharper focus the illiberal implications of marriage as a monogamous union. Those
few scholars who have analyzed the constitutionality of laws prohibiting adultery
suggest that such laws are unconstitutional given the Court’s decision in Lawrence,
where the Court held that mere moral interests were insufficient to uphold laws crim-
inalizing gay sex.366 This Article argues, in contrast, that as long as monogamy is
central to marriage, adultery is not based on mere moral considerations, even in the
case of an “open” marriage. This suggests a state may constitutionally criminalize
adultery not on the basis of mere moral considerations, but to protect governmental
interests that arise from marriage as a monogamous union.
Lawrence makes clear that the Constitution secures a sphere of sexual liberty for
everyone, married and unmarried alike.367 In his dissent, Scalia states that the majority
opinion renders suspect laws “against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bes-
tiality, and obscenity.”368 Without analyzing each of these types of activities, it is
relatively easy to see that Lawrence invalidates laws that criminalize fornication, gay
sex or sex among three or more individuals.369 Ultimately, and this Article assumes
364 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
365 See generally id.
366 See id. at 577–78 (“Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the
fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history
nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second,
individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relation-
ship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of ‘liberty’ protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to
intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons.” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))). See generally Cohen, supra note 69
(finding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence casts doubts on adultery bans);
JoAnne Sweeny, Undead Statutes: The Rise, Fall, and Continuing Uses of Adultery and
Fornication Criminal Laws, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 127 (2014) (finding that adultery bans
continue in America despite their uncertain constitutionality); Viator, supra note 360 (dis-
cussing Lawrence’s impact on the viability of adultery statutes).
367 539 U.S. at 578 (“The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime.”).
368 Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
369 See United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 629 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The liberty interest the
Court recognized in Lawrence was for adults engaging in consensual sexual relations in
private . . . .”); Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1222–23 (D. Utah 2013) (“The
court finds that the cohabitation prong does not survive rational basis review under the sub-
stantive due process analysis.”).
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as much, attempts to criminalize these kinds of non-commercial, “consensual sexual
activity”370 would raise constitutional problems under Lawrence.371 This is because
such laws rest only on contested moral premises that some, but certainly not all,
Americans share. In these cases, the state problematically seeks to prohibit mere
moral wrongs. The rejection of legal moralism is a familiar feature of much liberal
theory, one that goes back to the Devlin-Hart debate over morals legislation372 and
Mill’s argument about self-regarding actions.373 Lawrence, and cases like it, inform
this feature.374
Adultery, however, poses a more difficult problem given that it often involves
an innocent spouse who may be harmed by the infidelity. This is why Richard
Wasserstrom argues that in such cases, adultery can be immoral on one or both of
two distinct grounds:
The first is that things like promise-breaking and deception are just
wrong. The second is that adultery involving promise-breaking
370 See, e.g., Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 769 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Broadly
speaking, no one disputes a right to be free from government interference in matters of
consensual sexual privacy.”); Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1032–33 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“The Lawrence Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects the right of two individuals to engage in fully and mutually consensual private sexual
conduct.”); Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 (“Consensual sexual privacy is the touchstone
of the rational basis review analysis in this case, as in Lawrence.”); United States v. Goings,
72 M.J. 202, 206 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (“No one disagrees that wholly private and consensual
sexual activity, without more, falls within Lawrence.”); Toghill v. Commonwealth, 768
S.E.2d 674, 679 (Va. 2015) (“[T]he Lawrence opinion clearly states that individuals are
entitled to respect for their private lives such that adults are entitled to engage in private, con-
sensual, noncommercial sexual conduct without intervention of the government.”); In re
Williams, 253 P.3d 327, 337 (Kan. 2011) (citing Lawrence for the proposition that “a state
may not prohibit two adults from engaging in private, consensual sexual practices”); Jegley
v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 350 (Ark. 2002) (“[T]he fundamental right to privacy implicit in our
law protects all private, consensual, noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy between adults.”);
State v. Pope, 608 S.E.3d 114, 116 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (“Therefore, the Lawrence Court
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of two
individuals to engage in fully and mutually consensual private sexual conduct.”).
371 This Article leaves the issue of prostitution to one side, realizing that liberals may
disagree over whether commercial sexual intimacy is part of this sphere of protected liberty.
See generally PETER DE MARNEFFE, LIBERALISM AND PROSTITUTION (2010) (evaluating
paternalism, prostitution, and government moralism).
372 See Lord Patrick Devlin, Morals and the Criminal Law, in MORALITY AND THE LAW
24 (Richard A. Wasserstrom ed., 1971); H. L. A. Hart, Immorality and Treason, in MORALITY
AND THE LAW, supra, at 49; see also 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988) (discussing legal moralism).
373 See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS (Stefan Collini
ed., 1989).
374 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590, 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Court’s decision “effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation”).
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or deception is wrong because it involves the straightforward in-
fliction of harm upon another human being—typically the non-
adulterous spouse—who has a strong claim not to have that harm
so inflicted.375
But even this argument does not automatically make adultery subject to state
criminalization. After all, there are many situations where individuals break promises
or deceive that do not warrant state interference. Two individuals may be unmarried
but dating and one partner decides to cheat. This may invite the same kind of harm
to the non-cheating partner as the harm felt by the non-cheating spouse. Or consider
two individuals who are best friends where one friend intentionally betrays the other
by disclosing a personal secret. Here, too, there is promise breaking and the infliction
of harm. But, in neither of these cases, would we say that this is a wrong inviting
state coercion.376 We may consider these immoral or wrong acts but not acts that war-
rant state action, let alone the imposition of the criminal law. After all, the state does
not recognize friendships or other kinds of non-married relationships.377
As long as the state recognizes and regulates marriage, adultery invites criminal-
ization. It is unlike betrayal by a friend, precisely because, other than marriage, the
state does not recognize friendship or any other kind of intimate union or relation-
ship with a legal status. By singling out the commitment to lifetime monogamy as
part of the civil institution of marriage, a married individual’s decision to be intimate
with someone other than his or her spouse is now very much an issue of public or state
concern. This is why Michael J. Wreen explains that “the concept of adultery is log-
ically parasitic on that of marriage; it is defined in terms of marriage, and adulterous
behavior [is] logically impossible in the absence of marriage.”378 Some legal cases
have even viewed adultery as “an offense against the marriage relation” itself,379
viewing adultery as detrimental to this civil institution.
375 Richard Wasserstrom, Is Adultery Immoral?, 5 PHIL. F. 513, 527 (1974); see also
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Retribution Revisited, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 5, 8 (2007)
(discussing the harm principle).
376 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, A Right to Do Wrong, 92 ETHICS 21 (1981). After all, the
Model Penal Code, proposed by the American Law Institute in 1962, recommends the
decriminalization of adultery, because adultery is a kind of “private immorality” that “should
be beyond the reach of the penal law.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and
fornication, at 439 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
377 See supra notes 298–352 and accompanying text.
378 Michael J. Wreen, What’s Really Wrong with Adultery, 3 INT’L J. APPLIED PHIL. 45,
46 (1986).
379 S. Sur. Co. v. Oklahoma, 241 U.S. 582, 586 (1916); see also Oliverson v. W. Valley City,
875 F. Supp. 1465, 1474 (D. Utah 1995) (discussing the history of prosecuting adultery as a
crime against marriage); Commonwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357, 360 (Mass. 1983) (holding
that adultery is an offense against the institution of marriage); State v. Brooks, 254 N.W. 374,
375 (Wis. 1934) (holding that adultery is a “transgression against the marriage relation”).
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It is important to realize that this conclusion is unavoidable, even in the case of
an “open” marriage, where the spouses agree to be sexually intimate with others.
Here, it is difficult to say that sex with your unmarried partner is immoral. There is
no cheating or lying involved, and both parties have agreed to it.
However, and this is the underlying sting of this part of the Article, this could
still be subject to criminalization. Those states that criminalize adultery do not pro-
vide a defense for being in an “open” marriage.380 Bushey, for instance, could not have
invoked the consent of his wife to thwart a possible prosecution of adultery based
on the Virginia statute.381 Monogamy is central to marriage. This explains why all fifty
states adopt state prohibitions on numerosity and consanguinity as discussed above.382
If a state refuses to permit plural marriage in order to enforce the monogamous nature
of marriage, so too may a state decide to deter an “open” marriage.383 That is, the state
may seek to prevent those who do not make a lifetime commitment to monogamy
to avail themselves of the legal benefits of marriage. Now it may be difficult for the
state to stop two individuals from marrying who later decide not to be monogamous.
Imposing a numerosity or relational requirement to marriage is far easier to enforce.
However, this does not mean that the state may not deter such adulterous behavior by,
for instance, passing laws that criminalize this kind of sexual activity even in the case
of an “open” marriage. Contra Scalia, laws criminalizing adultery do not simply rest on
moral sentiments like laws that would ban gay sex or sex among three individuals.384
Admittedly, the criminal law is obviously the most powerful mechanism by
which to prohibit or deter certain behavior. It no doubt represents a serious infringe-
ment of liberty and in precisely that area which involves the most personal and inti-
mate of decisions. But it is hardly problematic for the state to deploy the criminal
law to protect governmental or state interests. Joel Feinberg, for instance, interprets
Mill’s classic Harm Principle as permitting the state to prevent this type of harm:
Governmental interests are “those generated in the very activities
of governing,” such as collecting taxes, registering aliens, con-
scripting an army, customs-inspecting, conducting trials and court
hearings, operating prisons, etc. These are the interests violated
in such “impersonal crimes” as tax fraud, failure to register, per-
jury, bribing a governmental official, and escaping from prison.385
380 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (2018).
381 See generally Turley, supra note 354 (recalling the details and results from the Bushey
case).
382 Laura A. Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 769,
771 (2013) (“All states mandate that members of couples . . . are [not] within a certain degree
of cosanguinity or legal relation.”).
383 See id. at 771–72 (arguing that the state serves as the “exclusive gatekeeper of legal
marriage”).
384 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
385 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 63
(1984) (footnote omitted). In fact, Roberts concludes that Kennedy’s opinion operates at least
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These kinds of infringements on liberty are justifiable given the interests they
secure. In criminalizing adultery, the state also seeks to protect certain important gov-
ernmental interests, in this case the institution of marriage. To be clear, this Article
is not suggesting that a state must deter adulterous behavior, even in the case of an
“open” marriage, by passing criminal legislation. Rather, if a state decides to protect
marriage by outlawing adultery, such laws do not rest on the kind of moral reasons
that are otherwise constitutionally inadmissible.
Consider that federal law provides a penalty of five years’ imprisonment and a
$250,000 fine for “[a]ny individual who knowingly enters into a marriage for the pur-
pose of evading any provision of the immigration laws.”386 One of the benefits mar-
riage provides is a privileged immigration status.387 To ensure that this benefit is only
available to couples that have made a genuine lifetime commitment, the government
deploys the criminal law to deter fraudulent marriage, even imposing a penalty of jail
time.388 Without civil marriage, the government would have no occasion to pass such
legislation. It is precisely because the state recognizes marriage, providing crucial
benefits, responsibilities, and privileges that accompany this legal status, that the state
has an interest in protecting that “transcendent” status.389 The crime of marriage fraud
is parasitic on the state’s recognition of marriage.
If there is no constitutional problem with deploying the criminal law to deter fraud-
ulent marriages for purposes of immigration, why may the state not deter individuals
from violating their commitment to lifetime monogamy? This commitment is not
an easy or flippant commitment. According to Obergefell, “[no] union is more pro-
found than marriage.”390 The Court goes on to say that “[i]n forming a marital union,
two people become something greater than once they were,” as marriage is “one of
civilization’s oldest institutions.”391 Adultery poses a problem that goes to the core of
this institution. So if we care about preserving a sphere of sexual liberty, we ought
to contest, not celebrate or support, marriage.
For, it is precisely in securing or supporting this commitment that a state may
decide to pass and then enforce criminal laws in order to deter adultery, including
deterring individuals from being in an “open” marriage. The Model Penal Code con-
siders the criminal law to be an “exceedingly blunt instrument with which to attempt
in part on the acceptance of this principle. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2622 (2015)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Then and now, this assertion of the ‘harm principle’ sounds
more in philosophy than law.”).
386 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2012).
387 Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV.
1625, 1634 (2007) (noting the federal immigration system passes judgment on these cases,
not traditional family law courts).
388 See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c).
389 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
390 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
391 Id.
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to monitor such [marital] relationships.”392 There are, of course, other ways to do so
that may not involve the criminal law. Instead, a state could reform the no-fault divorce
regime, where, as it stands now, individuals may procure a divorce for any reason
or no reason at all.393 Making divorce more difficult may be one way to strengthen
or protect the institution of marriage.394 Eric Rasmusen considers civil, as well as
criminal penalties for adultery, from a perspective of efficiency, ultimately concluding
that the best penalty will depend on empirical judgments.395 Such judgments will also
include what type of punishment should attach to a crime of adultery.396 It may very
well be appropriate to consider adultery a misdemeanor on par with loitering or pub-
lic intoxication.
The point is that, given the state’s recognition of marriage, laws criminalizing
adultery are not constitutionally equivalent to laws that would criminalize gay sex,
premarital sex, or sex among three or more individuals. Given the nature of marriage
as a monogamous union, the state has an interest, perhaps even a compelling one,397
392 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fornication, at 438 (AM. LAW INST.,
Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
393 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Marital Commitment and the Legal Regulation of Divorce,
in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 35 (Antony W. Dnes & Robert
Rowthorn eds., 2002).
394 Id. at 36 (arguing that the no-fault divorce regime “has destabilized marriage and un-
dermined the ability of couples to achieve their goals for their relationship”).
395 See Eric Rasmusen, An Economic Approach to Adultery Law, in THE LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 393, at 70, 89 (“Civil damages, criminal
law, and self-help all have their advantages and disadvantages. The law need not restrict it-
self to one of these . . . . Which laws are best depends heavily on empirical magnitudes such
as the strength of public offense, the amount of damage to injured spouses, and the assets
available for paying judgments.”).
396 See id.
397 Conventional constitutional wisdom contends that the Court subjects laws that violate
fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy, to strict scrutiny, where the law must have
a compelling purpose and be narrowly tailored to that purpose. See United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (noting that “when legislation appears on its face to
be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments”
or when it discriminates against “discrete and insular minorities,” a stricter standard than
rational review is merited). But see JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED
LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 238–39 (2013) (revealing the “myth of
strict scrutiny for fundamental rights”: “[D]ue process cases protecting liberty and autonomy—
from Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) through Casey (1992) and Lawrence (2003) . . . show that
due process jurisprudence is not absolutist nor does it reflect an impoverishment of judgment.
None of these cases applies the framework [of strict scrutiny]. To the contrary, these cases
reflect what Casey and Justice Harlan called ‘reasoned judgment’ concerning our ‘rational
continuum’ of ‘ordered liberty.’”). For an argument that strict scrutiny is problematic and un-
necessary in the case of individual fundamental rights, see generally BEDI, supra note 45. This
Article largely avoids applying the strict versus rational review standards, focusing instead
on the justificatory implications for laws criminalizing adultery given the existence of marriage
as a monogamous union.
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to protect what Kennedy calls a “central institution of the Nation’s society.”398 Hence,
it is difficult to claim that laws against adultery, even in the case of an “open” mar-
riage, are based only on moral considerations. These laws may very well be constitu-
tional. Given the fact that marriage is a monogamous union, the state may now seek
to protect it by enacting and enforcing these laws, as Virginia did.399
If individuals such as John Bushey do not desire to be subject to laws against
adultery,400 and hence maintain the private nature of their intimate relationships, they
need simply not get married. The state does not require an individual to marry. If
Bushey desires to live in a polyamorous relationship, he could refrain from marriage.
An investigation into marriage fraud requires that the married couple answer personal,
intimate questions about their relationship.401 Imagine if this couple invoked the pro-
tection of privacy to thwart such an investigation, arguing that these kinds of questions
are illegitimately intrusive. We would rightly dismiss their objection. By availing
themselves of a legal status that comes with certain governmental benefits and privi-
leges, including a favored immigration status, the couple has invited the state into
their relationship.
Put differently, once they chose to marry, they have forfeited in certain respects
the private nature of their relationship because the state seeks to protect the institu-
tion of marriage. The state has an interest in ensuring that marriage benefits are not
being taken advantage of by a relationship (such as an “open” one) where the indi-
viduals do not seek a genuine commitment to lifetime monogamy.402 The legal status
of marriage invites the state to subject what would otherwise be an intimate relation-
ship to regulation.
Laws that seek to prohibit the private, intimate relations of consenting adults are
often seen as paradigmatically illiberal, resting on contested moral or religious prem-
ises on what constitute the good life.403 Martha Nussbaum, in her argument against
sodomy laws, suggests that “[i]n addition to same-sex sexual acts, adultery, fornication,
and masturbation” involve “consensual conduct in seclusion” that the state ought not
398 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
399 See Turley, supra note 354 (discussing the 2004 prosecution of John Bushey for the
charge of adultery in Virginia).
400 See id.
401 See Nina Bernstein, Could Your Marriage Pass the Test?, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2010,
8:45 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/marriage-test/?ref=nyregion; (describ-
ing questions reported by attorneys present during such marriage fraud interviews, including
“If you are lying in bed, which side does your spouse sleep on?” and “Do you and your spouse
use birth control? What kind?”).
402 Cf. Open Marriage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/open%20marriage [https://perma.cc/CWN5-P7WK] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018) (defining open
marriage as “a marriage in which the partners agree to let each other have sexual partners
outside the marriage”).
403 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (describing how historical
condemnation of homosexual conduct “has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of
right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family”).
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to prohibit.404 But we undermine this liberty if we permit states to recognize marriage.
Marriage opens the way for the state to protect the institution by prohibiting certain
kinds of consensual sex. This represents a crucial illiberal implication of marriage. It
invites states to criminalize what consenting adults do in their intimate lives. Marriage,
in turn, permits states to infringe upon sexual liberty.
V. IF NOT MARRIAGE, WHAT? CURATIVE STEPS TO LIBERAL NEUTRALITY
This Article has argued that marriage is an illiberal union. In recognizing marriage
as a legal status, the state violates liberal neutrality by taking sides in what ought to be
each adult’s individual decision about how to live their personal life. Part V of this
Article reconciles this argument with the Court’s affirmation of a fundamental right
to marry. It then briefly considers what a state without marriage would look like, espe-
cially in light of ensuring equal citizenship for gays and lesbians.
A. State Action and the Fundamental Right to Marry
At first glance, the argument of this Article may seem in tension with the fact
that the Court has affirmed a constitutional right to marry.405 In some sense this is
true: the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution is in opposition to a commitment
to liberal neutrality. But the right to marry, like other constitutional rights, applies only
to actions by the state.406
A cornerstone of American constitutional law is the state action doctrine. The
Bill of Rights, along with various other constitutional rights, applies only to actions
by government actors.407 The First Amendment reads in part: “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech.”408 These first ten amendments and the constitu-
tional rights they contain apply to Congress and (for most) by incorporation to the
states.409 The Fourteenth Amendment reads in part that “nor shall any State deprive
404 NUSSBAUM, supra note 220, at 59, 61 (“[T]he time seems to have come when we can
all agree that some intimately personal matters are simply not matters for the police to
control . . . .”).
405 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (recognizing a fundamental
right to marriage and extending said right to same-sex couples).
406 As per the “state action doctrine,” “absent some action on the part of a state entity . . .
there can be no constitutional violation.” Developments in the Law: State Action and the
Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1255 (2010).
407 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10–11 (1883) (“The first section of the Four-
teenth Amendment . . . is prohibitory in its character . . . . It is State action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights [by private actors] is not
the subject-matter of the amendment.”).
408 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
409 In different words, these amendments place no direct limitations on private entities. See
U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
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any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”410 These constitutional
rights apply only to governmental actors.411 The Civil Rights Cases,412 for instance,
make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment reaches only actions by the state, not ac-
tions by private or non-state actors.413
This state action requirement means with no such state action, there is no consti-
tutional violation.414 Put simply, the Constitution generally only limits what a state
may do. In fact, in two important cases, the Court has rejected the argument that the
Constitution even requires the state to protect one’s life. In DeShaney v. Winnebago,415
the Court held that a Wisconsin County Department of Social Services (DSS) did not
violate the Constitution by failing to protect a child who was beaten and placed in
a coma by his father.416 Over a four-year period, Joshua DeShaney was in the cus-
tody of his father and was beaten on numerous occasions.417 During that period, DSS
made numerous visits to the father’s house, documenting the abuse.418 But DSS did
not remove the child from the home.419 Ultimately, the father inflicted such severe
injuries on Joshua DeShaney that he placed the boy in a coma.420 Randy DeShaney,
the boy’s father, was tried and convicted for child abuse.421 He committed a crime
under Wisconsin law.422
410 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
411 Id. (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States.”); see also supra note 407 and accompanying text.
412 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
413 Id. at 10–11; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 237, at 519–35 (arguing that the state
action doctrine does not comport with modern jurisprudence); Helen Hershkoff, Horizontality
and the “Spooky” Doctrines of American Law, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 455, 486–505 (2011) (dis-
cussing an alternative interpretation based on “penumbras and emanations” in which state
values permeate into corporate activity); Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 111, 143 (1991) (arguing that state action,
“as presently understood,” is “drastically misconceived” and positing an “abolitionist” inter-
pretation that constitutes a state action when the state fails in its affirmative duty to protect
citizens from discrimination, even by private actors). But see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1, 4–5, 23 (1948) (holding that the enforcement of private agreements among property
owners that required subsequent owners of the pertinent parcels to be white violated the
Equal Protection Clause).
414 In different words, a state action is required in order for there to be a constitutional
violation.
415 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
416 Id. at 191–93.
417 Id.
418 Id. at 192–93.
419 Id.
420 Id. at 193.
421 Id.
422 To wit, the crime of child abuse. Id.
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The question faced by the Court was whether DSS violated the Due Process
Clause by depriving the child of his rights to life or liberty.423 The Court held there
was no presumptive constitutional violation, because there was no state action424:
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself re-
quires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased
as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of
certain minimal levels of safety and security.425
In rejecting the claim that there was a constitutional violation, the Court makes
clear that the Due Process Clause’s purpose “was to protect the people from the
State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other.”426 “The Framers
were content to leave the extent of governmental obligation in the latter area to the
democratic political processes.”427 And more recently, in Castle Rock v. Gonzales,428
the Court held that a Colorado police department did not violate the Constitution by
failing to enforce a restraining order, a failure that led to the murder of three girls by
their father.429 Jessica Gonzales secured a restraining order against Simon Gonzales,
her estranged husband and father of their three children.430 Gonzales notified the police
that her husband had unexpectedly taken the children.431 The police failed to investi-
gate and later that night he killed the children, only to be killed by the police in a shoot-
out later.432 Citing DeShaney, the Court held that this did not violate the Constitution
and in particular the Due Process Clause:
In light of today’s decision and that in DeShaney, the benefit
that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested
for a crime generally does not trigger protections under the Due
Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its “substantive”
manifestations.433
423 See id. at 194–95, 197 n.4 (stated differently, “whether the Due Process Clause im-
posed upon the State an affirmative duty to protect”).
424 See id. at 195.
425 Id.
426 Id. at 196.
427 Id.
428 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
429 Id. at 751–54.
430 Id. at 751–53. For mention of Simon’s name, see Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366
F.3d 1093, 1134 (10th Cir. 2004) (O’Brien, J., dissenting).
431 Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 753.
432 Id. at 753–54.
433 Id. at 768.
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With no state action—the Colorado police department failed to act—there is no con-
stitutional violation.434 Even the dissenting opinion in Castle Rock, like its counterpart
in DeShaney, does not affirm a requirement that the state act under the Constitution
to protect the life or liberty of its citizens.435 “It is perfectly clear [that the] Federal
Constitution itself [does not grant] respondent or her children any individual entitle-
ment to police protection.”436 Both DeShaney and Castle Rock held that there was
no violation of a constitutional right to life, liberty, or due process.437
This means that with no state action, there is no constitutional violation, as the
Constitution generally only limits what a state may do, not dictate what it must do.438
Under that framework, a state that simply refuses to marry individuals does not violate
the right to marry. Consider that in all the instances where the Court has declared that
the state has violated a right to marry, the constitutional question concerned state ac-
tion that limited marriage in some way: on the basis of race (Loving439), on the basis
of prison status (Safley440), or on the basis of sexuality (Obergefell441). These cases
contemplated access to marriage. That is, in these cases, the state treated individuals
unequally in granting marriage licenses. None of these cases concerned an instance
where the state simply failed to issue marriage licenses altogether. As Cass Sunstein
rightly points out: a right to marry is “an individual right of access to the official in-
stitution of marriage so long as the state provides that institution.”442
With no state action, with no such “official institution,” there is no presumptive
constitutional infraction. This is because constitutional rights are negative in charac-
ter. Rights like the rights to privacy,443 free speech,444 religion,445 or the right to bear
434 For discussion on the state action requirement, see supra notes 406–14 and accom-
panying text.
435 Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 773 (Stevens, J., dissenting); DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489
U.S. 189, 203–04 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
436 Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 773 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
437 Id. at 768 (majority opinion); DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194–95.
438 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195 (“The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on
the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.”).
439 See 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
440 See 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
441 See 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
442 Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2096 (2005)
(emphasis removed); see also Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1081 (9th Cir. 2012) (up-
holding district court’s invalidation of Proposition 8, a California amendment banning gay
marriage), vacated, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (dismissing appeal for
lack of standing). The Ninth Circuit reiterated: “[T]he Constitution [does] not compel the
state to confer [marriage] in the first place.”Perry, 671 F.3d at 1081.
443 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”).
444 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . .”).
445 See id. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
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arms446 all constrain state action. That is, a state violates them when it acts in a par-
ticular way, when it passes certain laws and policies. The right to privacy, for instance,
does not require that the state do anything. It only limits the kinds of laws the state
may pass, laws that for instance ban the use of contraception447 or restrict a woman’s
liberty to procure an abortion.448 The Constitution does not contain positive rights,
rights that require the state to provide a certain good or benefit. Only when the state
acts do constitutional rights become relevant. So if a state banned marriages, passing
a law that no private group could “marry” its members, this may very well violate a
fundamental right to marry. But refusing to recognize a private or religious marriage
means the state simply refuses to do something. With no state action, the Constitution
does not seem to apply.
B. Consequences of Abolishing Marriage: Private Contract and the State’s
Expressive Power
But if the state gets out of the marriage “business,” and current marriage laws are
abolished, what do we replace marriage with? This is an important question, one that
this Article does not seek to explicate fully. Rather, it discusses some of the conse-
quences of disestablishing marriage. One facet of this argument is the status of de-
pendents, and in particular children, who may benefit from a legal status. This is why
Metz, in part, argues for an intimate caregiving status, as outlined above.449 This
Article largely leaves the question of children and the state’s power to ensure their
protection in familial or organization units to one side. This is because as a matter
of constitutional law, the fundamental right to marry is not tied to procreation or the
raising of children.450 The Court, as noted above, rejects that assertion in both Safley
and Obergefell.451 Consequently, this Article focuses only on those relationships that
arise among adults. This Article has argued that as a matter of liberal neutrality, the
state’s recognition of marriage as a union between two adults is illiberal. The motivat-
ing question of this section is what to replace that status with.
In unraveling marriage, the state could leave adults to deploy the regime of prop-
erty and contract law to manage their personal and intimate affairs. Martha Fineman,
a prominent proponent of this view, argues:
[W]e should abolish marriage as a legal category and with it any
privilege based on sexual affiliation. . . . There would be no
446 See U.S. CONST. amend. II (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed.”).
447 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
448 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
449 See supra notes 343–47 and accompanying text (discussing Metz’s proposal to remove
the sexual, intimate aspect entirely).
450 See supra notes 101–13, 238–39, 286–309 and accompanying text.
451 See supra notes 101–13, 238–39, 286–309 and accompanying text.
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special legal rules governing the relationships between husband
and wife or defining the consequences of the status of marriage as
now exist in family law. In fact, these categories would no longer
have any legal meaning at all. Instead, the interactions of . . . sex-
ual affiliates would be governed by the same rules that regulate
other interactions in our society—specifically those of contract
and property, as well as tort and criminal law. . . . Of course,
people would be free to engage in “ceremonious” marriage; such
an event would, however, have no legal (enforceable in court)
consequences. If they didn’t execute a separate contract, there
would be no imposed terms as now operate in the context of
marriage. Any legal consequences would have to be the result of
a separate negotiation.452
If the state were no longer in the business of marriage, this would leave marriage as
a private good to be contracted for like other goods in the marketplace. It would per-
mit the most expansive view of liberty. The state would not privilege any kind of
relationship—sexual or otherwise—over any other. This has the upshot of ensuring
that the state does not take sides in our personal lives. If adults seek to join a plural
union, for instance, they need to simply draw up a contract or arrange property to ef-
fectuate their plans. In this way, the state is not sanctioning or declaring a particular
union as ethically superior over another.453 The state would be neutral among concep-
tions of how adults ought to arrange their personal and intimate lives. Some individ-
uals may choose not to so contract. Some may decide to have their own religious
groups “marry” them. But these ceremonies would have no public or civil status,
thereby maintaining a separation of church and state.
Simultaneously, the state would have no interest, under a regime where marriage
is a private contract, in regulating the sexual activity of those adults who undertake
such contracts. Although she does not discuss the problem of adultery, Fineman
realizes: “[T]he end of marriage as a state-regulated and state-defined institution would
undermine, perhaps entirely erode, the state interest in controlling and regulating
sexual affiliations. If no form of sexual affiliation were preferred, subsidized, and
452 FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 330, at 228–29 (footnote omitted); see also
Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy,
70 CALIF. L. REV. 204, 208 (1982) (arguing that contractual tools and processes can “lend
dignity and legitimacy to today’s diverse forms of intimate commitment”). See generally
Fineman, Meaning of Marriage, supra note 330, at 57–62.
453 See Michael Kinsley, Abolish Marriage, SLATE (July 2, 2003, 11:25 AM), http://www
.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/readme/2003/07/abolish_marriage.html [http://perma
.cc/6HCA-98X9] (arguing, before the legalization of gay marriage: “If marriage were an
entirely private affair . . . [g]ay marriage would not have the official sanction of government,
but neither would straight marriage. There would be official equality between the two . . . .”).
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protected by the state, none should be prohibited.”454 Adulterous behavior under a
regime of contract would be like any other form of private consensual sexual behavior
or affiliation. The state would have no reason to prohibit it, because the state would
no longer have the civil institution of marriage to protect.455
Admittedly, the fate of gays and lesbians are at the cross hairs of the argument
of this Article. After all, it is undeniable that as a sexual minority they have suffered
from the lack of recognition that comes with the state’s illiberal stamp of marriage.456
Heterosexual relationships are not seen as inferior. Straight individuals are not rou-
tinely harassed, beaten, bullied or even killed for being straight. But gay relationships
are seen as inferior; gay individuals are beaten and bullied for desiring someone of the
same sex.457 It is precisely the morally and ethically special status of marriage that
seeks to challenge this inferiority. Christie Hartley and Lori Watson argue that if there
were no state sanctioned marriage, marriage would simply be a private affair, one that
would be undertaken primarily by religious institutions.458 Under such a regime:
If the dominant religious institutions refuse to recognize same-sex
marriage and if, in a society with privatized marriage, these reli-
gious institutions are the primary institutions from which citizens
(even not very religious ones) seek legitimacy and affirmation of
their marital commitments, then these institutions will effectively
have a monopoly on the affirmation of marital commitment.459
Privatizing marriage has the potential to leave gays and lesbians as second-class
citizens, because their relationships would not have the legitimacy that comes with
being married. Currently, many major religious groups do not marry same-sex couples
within their own religious tradition.460 If the state were to suddenly get out of the mar-
riage business today, gays and lesbians would effectively be unable to get married
by mainstream religious groups. Gay and lesbian relationships, unlike their straight
counterparts, would be unable to have their desire to be in a committed relationship
socially recognized. This would further stigmatize gays and lesbians as deviant,
454 Fineman, Meaning of Marriage, supra note 330, at 59.
455 See supra notes 452–53 and accompanying text (suggesting that having the state get
out of the marriage business would “permit the most expansive view of liberty”).
456 See Sullivan, supra note 287 (describing, from his own experience as a homosexual man,
“how deep a psychic and social wound the exclusion from marriage and family can be”).
457 See, e.g., The Lesson of Matthew Shepard, Opinion, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 1998),
https://nyti.ms/2mBtg3r (recounting the brutal murder of a twenty-one-year-old gay man,
“singled out . . . because he was gay”).
458 See Christie Hartley & Lori Watson, Political Liberalism, Marriage and the Family,
31 LAW & PHIL. 185, 203–05 (2012).
459 Id. at 204.
460 See Masci & Lipka, supra note 91. This list includes Islam, Catholicism, Mormonism,
and Orthodox Judaism.
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abnormal, and, often in the case of gay men, sexually promiscuous. Civil marriage,
then, provides a way to counteract this kind of private discrimination by conferring
the legitimacy that comes with marriage and its commitment to lifetime monogamy.461
The very reason that marriage is problematic from a perspective of liberal neutrality
may explain why it is so important to gays and lesbians. The label of marriage pro-
vides the necessary ethical imprimatur to gay relationships.
If this discussion of abolition took place one hundred years from now, the con-
cern about leaving gay relationships in the lurch would be far less relevant. Perhaps
in that case, gays and lesbians themselves would largely favor abolishing marriage
in line with the queer theorists noted above.462 They would have had one hundred
years where the state has affirmed their relationships as morally special via the in-
stitution of marriage. To unwind the institution of marriage now seems unfair. This
may be the underlying concern for those who seek to invalidate prohibitions on
same-sex marriage while still maintaining the institution of marriage. That is, the
problem is not with abolishing marriage per se, but doing so at a time when gays
and lesbians have been unable to avail themselves of it.
Conceding that there is some appeal to this claim, perhaps there is another way
to challenge homophobia, if marriage is not an option consistent with liberal neutrality.
Again, the Constitution only limits state action, but does not generally require the
state to pass any particular law or policy.463 Nevertheless, this Article suggests a pos-
sible way that the state may challenge homophobia without maintaining marriage.
This involves the state’s spending or expressive power. Corey Brettschneider deploys
it in the problem over hate speech.464 Brettschneider’s concern is that liberals are often
461 See ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY
182 (1995) (“Marriage provides an anchor, if an arbitrary and often weak one, in the maelstrom
of sex and relationships to which we are all prone. . . . We rig the law in its favor . . . because
we recognize that not to promote marriage would be to ask too much of human virtue.”); see
also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 10 (1996) (“[S]exual variety has not been liberating to
gay men. In addition to the disease costs, promiscuity has . . . contributed to the stereotype
of homosexuals as people who lack a serious approach to life. . . . [The] gay community ought
to embrace marriage for its potentially civilizing effect on young and old alike.”); Sullivan,
supra note 287 (“For today’s generation of gay kids . . . they will be able to see their future
as part of family life—not in conflict with it”); Andrew Sullivan, Here Comes the Groom,
NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 28, 1989), https:/newrepublic.com/article/79054/here-comes-the-groom
[http://perma.cc/J24Y-Z6BH] (“Gay marriage . . . says for the first time that gay relationships
are not better or worse than straight relationships, and that the same is expected of them. And
it’s clear and dignified.”).
462 See supra notes 287–89 and accompanying text.
463 See supra notes 414–38 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between state
action that might infringe on constitutional rights and a state’s decision not to act).
464 See COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY? HOW
DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY 3–4, 109 (2012) (“[T]he
state can avoid complicity with hateful expression if it engages in democratic persuasion. By
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stuck with only two options with regards to hate speech, defined here as speech that
contradicts liberal values by expressing the idea that some groups are intrinsically
inferior: either deploy the coercive power of the state to censor this kind of speech, or
tolerate this speech, leaving victimized groups vulnerable to such verbal attacks.465
Brettschneider provides a provocative third alternative that draws not from the state’s
coercive power but rather from its “expressive power, or its ability to influence be-
liefs and behavior by ‘speaking.’”466 The state does not need to censor hate speech,
but may very well have an obligation to “speak” in favor of liberal values.467 It can
do this “in a variety of ways, ranging from the direct statements of politicians to the
establishment of monuments and public holidays.”468 Also, the state can express and
promote the value of equality “through [its] action as educator.”469 Brettschneider
includes as part of this expressive capacity the state’s use of public “funds for [such]
democratic persuasion.”470
This turn from coercion to expression provides a framework other than marriage
to challenge homophobia. As outlined in this Article, the state’s conferral of the status
of marriage violates liberal neutrality.471 This is in part because current marriage laws
rest on the idea that there is something intrinsically special about living in a monog-
amous union with another individual.472 To deploy this legal status to do the equality
work turns out to affirm an illiberal union. Yet, as an educator, the state could make
use of its expressive powers to buttress and validate the equality of gay and lesbian
relationships. For instance, public schools could include gays and lesbians in text-
books that discuss the struggle for equality in this country. Specifically, in sex edu-
cation classes, the state could ensure that students are taught that being gay or “coming
out” is an acceptable and legitimate option for individuals. In fact, the state could even
fund a print and media campaign that celebrates same-sex desires and relationships.
In doing so, and this is the crucial point, the state would not be saying that being gay
is intrinsically special or better than being straight. These kinds of expressive laws
criticizing hate groups and promoting the ideal of free and equal citizenship, the state can
clarify that its protection of groups from coercive intervention is not tantamount to approval
of their message. . . . [D]emocratic persuasion should not involve the coercive banning of any
viewpoint, but democratic persuasion rightly includes the state’s use of financial means to
promote the values of free and equal citizenship.”).
465 Id. at 1.
466 Id. at 3–4.
467 Id. at 95.
468 Id. 
469 Id.
470 Id. at 110.
471 See supra Part I.
472 See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 101, at 99 n.96 (stating that evidence presented by Propo-
sition 8 supporters showed that the bill’s passage was prompted by “a desire to advance the
belief that opposite-sex couples are morally superior to same-sex couples” (quoting Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 291, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2010))).
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and policies do not seek to privilege one way of living over another and thereby do
not violate liberal neutrality. In fact, they seek to challenge the idea that straight rela-
tionships are somehow better or more worthwhile than their gay counterparts. This
may be one way the state could both get out of the marriage “business” and simulta-
neously ensure the equal status of gays and lesbians.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps it is time to consider abolishing marriage. Marriage may seem like a
“great public institution” but this grandiosity reveals why it is also an illiberal one.
Importantly, this Article’s objection to marriage is not motivated by the fact that gay
marriage is now the law of the land. That anti-gay argument for leveling down—for
abolishing marriage for all—is not based on principles of liberalism. Rather, that
kind of illiberal argument seeks to exclude couples from marriage so as to ensure
that their gay counterparts may not marry.473 This Article, in contrast, objects to mar-
riage on the “principled view”474 that the state ought to remain neutral among con-
ceptions of the good in our personal and intimate lives. The Court’s jurisprudence
on marriage reveals why this kind of union violates liberal neutrality.
473 This is why Kenji Yoshino, supra note 57, argues that:
An individual could take the principled view that the state should not
be in the business of running recreational facilities. Yet even that indi-
vidual should have qualms if the reason a municipality closes a public
pool is to avoid integrating it on racial lines (the occurrence that triggered
Palmer v. Thompson). Similarly, an individual could hold the principled
view that the state should be out of the marriage business. Yet even that
individual should have qualms if the reason for shutting down civil
marriage is the threat of same-sex couples entering the institution.
Id. at 174 (footnote omitted).
474 See id.
